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Abstract 
This study investigates whether Regulation Fair Disclosure (hereafter Reg FD) was 
successful in leveling the playing field between institutional (large) and individual 
(small) investors in terms of their ability to profit by mimicking insider trading patterns. I 
identify trades made by large versus small investors and examine their relative ability to 
distinguish profitable insider trades from unprofitable trades. I argue that, prior to Reg 
FD, large institutional investors had superior access to management which enabled them 
to obtain material information before it was publicly announced. Such managerial access 
could have helped large investors to identify and mimic information-driven insider trades 
that were more likely to be profitable. Consistent with my expectation, I find that, in the 
pre-Reg FD period, large investors exhibit higher abnormal trading volume around 
insider trades that are ex post profitable; in contrast, small investors do not exhibit such a 
pattern. My main finding is that, after the passage of Reg FD, the abnormal trading 
volume around profitable insider trades observed for large investors disappears. The 
analysis of directional trading behavior of investors suggests that Reg FD was successful 
in mitigating large investors' ability to mimic profitable insider sales. On the other hand, 
in relation to insider purchases, I find that large investors' mimicking ability persists after 
the passage of Reg FD. While their superior mimicking ability post Reg FD may be due 
to their own expertise in information collection and processing, superior information 
access cannot be ruled out as an explanation. Overall, my findings suggest that the 
restrictions on private information disclosure instituted by Reg FD were largely effective 
in blocking management's selective communication channel and reducing the information 
advantage enjoyed by large investors. 
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1. Introduction 
On August 15, 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (hereafter Reg FD) to address concerns regarding the 
selective disclosure of information by publicly traded companies and other issuers. Reg 
FD provides that, when an issuer discloses material nonpublic information to certain 
individuals or entities, generally, securities market professionals such as stock analysts or 
major shareholders, who may well trade on the information, the issuer must make public 
disclosure of that information. Thus, by promoting full and fair disclosure, Reg FD 
attempts to level the informational playing field.  
 Although institutional investors were a major target of Reg FD on account of their 
superior access to corporate management, not many studies have examined the effect of 
Reg FD on their trading behavior. This paper examines whether Reg FD was successful 
in mitigating the information advantage that (large) institutional investors are known to 
have over (small) individual investors. I begin with the premise that, due to their 
preferential managerial access, institutional investors observe trades made by corporate 
insiders and are able to differentiate insider trades that are based on the insider’s private 
information from insider trades made for other reasons (e.g., insider’s liquidity needs). I 
investigate whether the implementation of Reg FD affected the relative ability of 
institutional investors vis-à-vis individual investors to identify and mimic information-
driven insider trades that are ex post profitable.  
There is some anecdotal evidence that institutional investors’ access to private 
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managerial information was not eliminated by Reg FD. Based on a survey report of the 
National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI), 79% of the 577 NIRI member respondents 
indicate that they continue to hold one-on-one meetings with institutional investors to the 
same or even greater extent after the passage of Reg FD. Thus, despite the disclosure 
restrictions of Reg FD, institutional investors may still seek access to management in the 
hope of gleaning nonpublic information. On the other hand, anecdotal evidence suggests 
that the SEC acted promptly after the passage of Reg FD in bringing actions against 
several companies and executives for Reg FD violations (e.g., Siebel Systems, and 
Raytheon). Consistent with the SEC's vigilant  enforcement efforts, if the private 
communication channel is blocked by Reg FD, I expect to observe a decline in the 
relative ability of institutional investors to mimic profitable insider trades.  
In the United States, information about trading conducted by insiders is public 
knowledge because insiders are required to file such information with the SEC. Many 
investors follow insider trades in the hope that mimicking these trades will be profitable. 
Even though regulations prohibit insiders to trade on material non-public information, 
some investors believe that insiders nonetheless make profitable trades either due to their 
private information or better insight into their firm's future prospects. There is ample 
evidence supporting this view, both anecdotal and academic. Over the period 2010-2013, 
the SEC has filed 168 insider trading actions against nearly 400 individuals and entities 
for illicit profits or avoided losses totaling approximately $600 million, more than in any 
three-year period in the agency’s history. Numerous commercial trading websites advise 
investors that mimicking insider trading is a low cost yet profitable trading strategy. 
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Various research studies show that although not all insider trades are profitable, insiders 
earn substantial positive abnormal returns when they purchase their companies’ stocks 
and avoid losses by selling their stocks several quarters in advance of the public release 
of bad news (e.g., Ravina and Sapienza 2010). However, insiders may trade for a variety 
of reasons, such as personal liquidity, diversification, portfolio balancing, private 
information, and diverse incentives to signal the market. Although outsiders can observe 
their trading activities, the motivation behind a certain trade is difficult to decipher. 
Without knowing whether an insider trade is driven by private information, the 
profitability of following a certain insider trade is largely uncertain. Given these features 
of insider trading activity, I hypothesize that, post Reg FD, the ability of institutional 
investors vis-à-vis individual investors to mimic profitable insider trades will decline. I 
test my hypothesis over two trading windows, the pre-filing window in which the insider 
trade is not yet publicly disclosed, and the post-filing window when the insider trade is 
public knowledge although its nature is not.
1
  
In the pre-Reg FD period, I argue that institutional investors are more likely to 
have private communication with company insiders and obtain material information that 
is not publicly disclosed. In the pre-filing window, institutional investors may acquire 
private managerial information about certain insider trading activities or future events, 
which may lead them to trade based on the same motivation as insiders, while the general 
public is not aware of such trading activities or future events. In the post-filing window, 
even though now the insider trade is public knowledge, institutional investors' access to 
                                                 
1
 The pre-filing window begins 10 days prior to the trade date and ends one day before the date of filing. 
The post-filing window is a four-day event window following the filing date.   
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private information can help them better interpret insider trading signals. Therefore, in 
both the pre- and post-filing windows, institutional investor trades will be more aligned 
with profitable insider trading activities. In other words, in the pre-Reg FD regime, 
institutional investors are more likely to be able to distinguish profitable information-
driven insider trades from insider trades due to other reasons, e.g., liquidity, which may 
not necessarily be profitable. In contrast, individual investors are less likely to be able to 
distinguish profitable insider trades from unprofitable trades, since they do not have 
access to material insider information. Therefore I expect that their trades will be 
correlated with both profitable and unprofitable insider trades. 
After the passage of Reg FD, since the channel of selective disclosure is blocked, 
institutional investors should not have access to material nonpublic information. 
Therefore, I hypothesize that institutional investors’ ability to distinguish profitable 
insider trades from unprofitable ones will diminish. Alternatively, the pattern of 
institutional trading may not change if their distinguishing ability in the pre-Reg FD 
period was not due to their access to managerial private information but rather due to 
their own expertise in information collection, analysis and evaluation. For small 
investors, since Reg FD is less likely to have changed their information environment, I do 
not expect the correlation between their trades and insider trades to change.  
I use detailed intraday transaction data from the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) 
database to examine the trading response of different classes of investors and examine 
how their trades correlate with insider trades that are ex-post profitable. Following prior 
research (e.g., Lee 1992; Lee and Radhakrishna 2000; Bhattacharya 2001; Bhattacharya 
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et al. 2007), I rely on the Lee-Ready algorithm (Lee and Ready 1991) to infer trade 
direction (buy versus sell) and use dollar value of trades to distinguish larger, well-
informed, sophisticated investors, which are assumed to be primarily institutional 
investors, from smaller, less informed, and less sophisticated investors, which are 
assumed to be primarily individual investors.
2
  
Compared to insider trades motivated by reasons such as liquidity needs or 
portfolio balancing, I expect that trades motivated by the insiders’ private information are 
likely to be profitable on average. I use ex post profitability to distinguish information-
driven insider trades from insider trades driven by other reasons. Specifically, an insider 
purchase (sale) is classified as information driven if the ex post realized six-month 
market adjusted return subsequent to the trade date is positive (negative).  
My empirical results in general support my predictions. In the pre-Reg FD 
regime, I find that large investors exhibit higher abnormal trading volume around 
profitable insider trades in the pre-filing window, suggesting that large investors have 
access to private information about the firm’s future prospects/events that insiders may 
trade on or information regarding insiders’ trading activities. Such a pattern also exists in 
the post-filing window, indicating that large investors can distinguish profitable versus 
unprofitable insider trades. In contrast, small investors do not exhibit such trading 
patterns in either the pre or the post filing windows. More interestingly, I find that the 
                                                 
2
 This classification approach is widely used in prior studies (e.g., Bhattacharya 2007; Chiyachantana et al. 
2004). One drawback of this approach is that large trades may be broken into small ones so that the 
measures for small investors’ trades are contaminated. Since this problem is believed to be more severe 
after 2006, it is less applicable to my sample period which ends prior to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (2002). Moreover, misclassifying institutional investors' trades as those of individual investors will bias 
against finding differential results between the two groups.  
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incremental abnormal trading volume around profitable insider trades observed for large 
investors disappears after the passage of Reg FD in both the pre-filing and the post-filing 
windows. 
Separate investigation of insider purchases and insider sales with directional 
abnormal net-buy of shares by investors suggests that Reg FD was successful in 
mitigating institutional investors' ability to mimic profitable insider sales as well as 
purchases in the pre-filing window. In the case of individual investors, I find that they 
have no ability to mimic profitable insider sales as well as purchases in the pre-filing 
window both pre and post Reg FD. 
In the post-filing window, I find that, while the ability of institutional investors to 
mimic profitable insider sales is diminished after Reg FD, they are still able to mimic 
profitable insider purchases. The diminished ability of institutional investors to mimic 
profitable insider sales could be due to the greater difficulty of deciphering the 
motivation behind insider sales relative to insider purchases without access to private 
information. This is because insiders' liquidity needs could drive insider sales but may 
not affect insider purchases. In the post-filing window, individual investors also exhibit a 
limited ability to mimic profitable insider purchases (but not sales) and this ability is 
unchanged after Reg FD.  
My results show that, in relation to profitable insider purchases, both individual 
and institutional investors exhibit mimicking ability in the post-filing window after Reg 
FD. Thus, it appears that Reg FD may have successfully leveled the playing field 
between institutional and individual investors, and that the mimicking success of 
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institutional investors can be attributed to their own incentives and expertise rather than 
managerial access.
3
 However, I find that the mimicking ability in relation to profitable 
insider purchases is (weakly) greater for institutional investors relative to individual 
investors in the post-Reg FD period, suggesting that institutional investors may still have 
a comparative advantage and that Reg FD may not have fully leveled the information 
playing field.  
Overall, my findings suggest that the restrictions on private information 
disclosure instituted by Reg FD were largely effective in blocking management's 
selective communication channel, thereby reducing the information advantage enjoyed by 
large investors and improving fairness in the capital market.  
My study contributes to our understanding of the effectiveness of Reg FD. By 
investigating how institutional investors’ trades correlate with profitable insider trades in 
both pre- and post-Reg FD periods, my study suggests that Reg FD was in general 
effective in eliminating selective disclosures of material nonpublic information, reducing 
institutional investors’ information advantage, and leveling the playing field between 
individual investors and institutional investors. In a closely related paper, Ke, Petroni and 
Yu (2008) also examine the impact of Reg FD on institutional investors’ trading 
behavior. These authors show that, in the pre-Reg FD period, transient institutional 
investors have abnormal stock sales in the quarter immediately preceding the disclosure 
of bad news; however, a similar pattern is not observed in the post-Reg FD period, 
                                                 
3
 This is consistent with prior evidence, that insider trading profits concentrate on the purchase side (e.g., 
Aboody and Lev, 2000; Huddart and Ke, 2007; Jagolinzer et al., 2011), so that investors are more likely to 
apply their own ability and expertise in information collection, analysis, and evaluation to correctly identify 
profitable insider purchases. 
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suggesting that Reg FD effectively reduced the selective disclosure of bad earnings news. 
By investigating trading activities of institutional and individual investors over narrow 
windows around insider-trade filings, my paper provides evidence on the effectiveness of 
Reg FD through a different mechanism. While Ke, Petroni and Yu (2008) focus on 
extreme negative earnings news and institutional investors’ sales behavior, the insider 
trading setting in my paper allows for the inclusion of any type of corporate event or 
news - both positive and negative news, and examines both selling and purchasing 
behavior. While my results on insider sales support their findings, on the insider 
purchases side, the results are not as clear-cut.  My findings indicate that, institutional 
investors may still have better ability to distinguish and mimic profitable insider 
purchases relative to individual investors, suggesting that Reg FD may not have 
eliminated all private communication between institutional investors and corporate 
management. My paper’s findings could potentially be useful to the SEC in supporting its 
recent revamping efforts toward better enforcement of Reg FD after a four-year long 
hiatus in Reg FD enforcement actions.
4
  
My study also contributes to the institutional investor literature by testing whether 
institutional investors’ advantage comes from their superior ability to process information 
or their superior (nonpublic) information access. Reg FD offers a natural setting to 
investigate the relative importance of the two sources of institutional investors' 
information advantage. My results suggest that institutional investors’ superior 
                                                 
4
 The four-year hiatus followed after the SEC was chastised for being "overly aggressive" by the district 
court that dismissed a Reg FD action brought by the SEC in 2004 against Siebel Systems, Inc. and two of 
its executives.  
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performance pre Reg FD came mainly from their superior information source as opposed 
to their expertise in information processing.  
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. I discuss related literature and 
develop my hypotheses in section 2. Section 3 describes the procedure to estimate 
abnormal trading measures of institutional investors and individual investors and presents 
details of the research design. Section 4 presents the sample selection procedure and the 
empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Reg FD 
The SEC adopted Reg FD in August 2000 in response to concerns that publicly traded 
companies selectively disclose material nonpublic information to certain market 
participants, such as institutional investors and security analysts, at the expense of 
individual investors.  Reg FD prohibits a public company, or any person acting on its 
behalf, to disclose material managerial information to selected parties when it is 
reasonably foreseeable that these parties will trade the company’s securities on the basis 
of such information. In recent times, the SEC has increased its vigilance and brought 
several actions against  firms and executives, including American Commercial Lines Inc., 
Presstek Inc., Office Depot, and First Solar for Reg FD violations. In almost all cases, the 
actions were resolved through settlement with penalties and cease-and-desist orders. 
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2.2 Prior research on the effects of Reg FD 
Many prior studies investigate whether Reg FD promotes a shift towards a richer 
public information environment by focusing on its effect on market-level outcomes, such 
as return volatility, trading volume, and bid-ask spread (e.g., Heﬂin et al. 2003; Bailey et 
al. 2003). Most studies that test the effects of Reg FD on market participants focus on 
sell-side analysts (see Francis, Nanda and Wang 2006 for a summary). These papers 
generally investigate whether Reg FD affects the accuracy and dispersion of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts or the stock market’s reaction to analysts’ reports (e.g., Heﬂin et al., 
2003; Bailey et al., 2003; Irani and Karamanou, 2003; Gintschel and Markov, 2004). 
However, research findings in this stream of literature have been largely mixed.
5
 A few 
studies investigate another key target of Reg FD—institutional investors. Chiyachantana 
et al. (2004) find that Reg FD is associated with a decrease in the frequency and volume 
of institutional trading in the 13 trading hours prior to an earnings announcement. Li et al. 
(2011) investigate the impact of Reg FD on transient institutional investors’ abnormal 
trading behavior around accounting restatements and find that transient institutional 
investors exhibit abnormal selling of restating firms’ stocks one quarter before the 
restatement is publicly announced in the pre-Reg FD period and there is no such trading 
pattern in the post-Reg FD period. Similarly, Ke et al. (2008) investigate the effect of Reg 
FD when there is a break in a string of positive quarterly earnings and find that, with the 
passage of Reg FD, the abnormal selling pattern of transient institutional investors prior 
                                                 
5
 For example, Irani and Karamanou (2003) find that analyst following reduced and analyst forecast 
dispersion increased after Reg FD, suggesting lower information availability. On the other hand, Heflin, 
Subramanyam, and Zhang (2003) find that Reg FD has not impeded the information flow to financial 
analysts and may have actually increased voluntary disclosures of forward-looking data related to earnings. 
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to the break disappears.  
2.3 Prior research on small versus large investors 
Several prior papers examine the differential trading behavior of small and large 
investors in response to information events. Cready and Mynatt (1991) document an 
increase in the number of trades around the annual report release date and find that the 
trading response is driven by small investors, suggesting that small investors rely more on 
the public information system. Lee (1992) provides evidence that small investors trade 
for a longer time after an earnings announcement than large investors. Some prior studies 
also find that small investors use the seasonal random-walk model to form earnings 
expectations, and are more likely to trade on pro forma information (Bhattacharya 2001; 
Bhattacharya et al. 2007). Asthana et al. (2004) document that the change to EDGAR 
filings results in a significant increase in small investor trading volume, but no such 
increase in large investor trading volume. Miller (2010) finds that more complex 
financial reporting is associated with a reduction in small investors’ trading activities.  
2.4 Prior research on insider trading 
Insiders can earn excess profits by trading on their perceived stock mispricing or 
by using their superior knowledge about future cash flow realizations (Piotroski and 
Roulstone 2005). There is ample evidence that insider trading activities generate 
abnormal returns (e.g., Givoly and Palmon, 1985; Seyhun 1986, 1998; Rozeff and Zaman 
1988). Some studies find that insider trading profits concentrate on the purchase side 
(e.g., Aboody and Lev, 2000; Huddart and Ke, 2007; Jagolinzer et al., 2011), while other 
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studies present evidence that insider sales predict negative abnormal returns (e.g., Seyhun 
1986, 1998; Ke et al. 2003; Cohen et al. 2012). In spite of the empirical evidence that 
largely indicates that insider trades are profitable, the question of whether outside 
investors can profit from following insider trading is still open to discussion. Seyhun 
(1986) and Rozeff and Zaman (1988) point out that outside investors do not gain by 
mimicking insider trades due to transaction costs, while Bettis et al. (1997) find that 
outside investors can still earn excess returns net of transaction costs by focusing on 
insider trades of large magnitude made by top executives. 
2.5 Hypotheses development 
I develop two sets of hypotheses to empirically test the impact of Reg FD on the 
ability of institutional investors versus individual investors to benefit from distinguishing 
profitable insider trades from unprofitable trades.  
2.5.1 Pre-Reg FD period 
The first set of hypotheses tests whether institutional investors can identify and 
mimic profitable insider trades in the pre-Reg FD regime. In other words, before 
proceeding to the exploration of the mitigating effect of Reg FD on institutional 
investors’ ability to identify and trade more on profitable insider trades, a base-line result 
that institutional investors actually trade more on profitable insider trades in the pre-Reg 
FD period needs to be established.  
Prior to Reg FD, firm managers were known to selectively disclose material 
information to preferred groups (analysts, institutional investors, etc.). Private 
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communication with firm managers can grant institutional investors opportunities to 
possess information regarding insider trading activity along with the motivation behind 
those trades. In the period prior to insider trades, while insiders are not likely to disclose 
their trading intention from fear of eroding their own profits, institutional investors can 
still access material information regarding future events which could form the basis for 
the imminent insider trade. In contrast, individual investors did not have private access to 
managerial information even in the pre-Reg FD period with which to infer imminent 
insider trades or the firm's future events. Thus, I predict that, in the pre-filing window, 
institutional investors can identify and mimic profitable insider trades, while individual 
investors cannot.  
Pre-filing window:    
H1a: Ceteris paribus, in the pre-Reg FD period, trades made by institutional investors in 
the pre-filing window have a higher association with profitable insider trades 
relative to unprofitable insider trades.  
H1b: Ceteris paribus, in the pre-Reg FD period, trades made by individual investors in 
the pre-filing window have no differential association between profitable and 
unprofitable insider trades. 
After insiders file information about their trading activities with the SEC, the 
information becomes publicly available. Due to their managerial access, institutional 
investors possess an information advantage even in the post-filing window which helps 
them interpret insider trading signals and distinguish profitable insider trades from 
unprofitable ones. In contrast, individual investors have no such advantage since they do 
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not have private access to the management. Although individual investors can observe 
the insider trade in the post-filing window, they are less likely to have the expertise for 
information processing to be able to differentiate profitable from unprofitable insider 
trades and mimic them.  
Post-filing window: 
H1c: Ceteris paribus, in the pre-Reg FD period, trades made by institutional investors in 
the post-filing window have a higher association with profitable insider trades 
relative to unprofitable insider trades.  
H1d: Ceteris paribus, in the pre-Reg FD period, trades made by individual investors in 
the post-filing window have no differential association between profitable and 
unprofitable insider trades.  
2.5.2 Post-Reg FD period 
With the passage of Reg FD, the SEC prohibits selective disclosure of material 
information to preferred groups. If Reg FD is effective in curtailing private 
communication between institutional investors and management, I expect a decrease in 
institutional investors’ information supply and thus a reduction in their information 
advantage.  For both the pre-filing period and the post-filing period, with the private 
information channel blocked, institutional investors’ ability to identify profitable insider 
trades is likely to be reduced. In contrast, Reg FD has no effect on individual investors, as 
they do not possess a private communication channel to begin with. Therefore, I derive 
my second set of hypotheses, stated in the alternative form as follows.  
Pre-filing window: 
  15 
H2a: Ceteris paribus, the association of trades made by institutional investors in the pre-
filing window with profitable relative to unprofitable insider trades reduces in the 
post-Reg FD period. 
H2b: Ceteris paribus, the association of trades made by individual investors in the pre-
filing window with profitable relative to unprofitable insider trades does not change 
in the post-Reg FD period. 
Post-filing window: 
H2c: Ceteris paribus, the association of trades made by institutional investors in the post-
filing window with profitable relative to unprofitable insider trades reduces in the 
post-Reg FD period. 
H2d: Ceteris paribus, the association of trades made by individual investors in the post-
filing window with profitable relative to unprofitable insider trades does not change 
in the post-Reg FD period. 
 The next section describes the measurement of variables, the research design and 
sample selection procedures. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Classification of trades made by small and large investors 
The identity of investors trading stocks is not public information in the U.S. Prior 
research identifies investor type, namely, large institutions versus small individual 
investors, based on trade size (Easley and O’Hara 1987; Cready 1988; Hasbrouch 1991; 
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Chan and Lakonishok 1993; Lee and Radhakrishna 2000; Bharttacharya 2001; 
Bharttacharya et al. 2007; Miller 2010; Ayers et al. 2011). This is based on the 
assumption that large institutional investors, backed by more resources, are likely to 
make larger trades on average, while less wealthy individual investors are likely to make 
smaller trades. Following this line of research, I use the dollar value of the transaction to 
distinguish trades made by small investors from those by large investors (e.g., Lee 1992; 
Lee and Radhakrishna 2000; Bhattacharya 2001; Bhattacharya et al. 2007).
6
  
Specifically, I classify trades of $5,000 or less as trades made by small investors, 
trades between $5,000 and $50,000 as medium-sized trades, and trades over $50,000 as 
trades made by large investors. Existing research suggests that institutional investors do 
not always trade in large orders. They may break large orders into medium-sized trades to 
disguise their private information (Kyle 1985; Cornell and Sirri 1992; Meulbroek 1992; 
Barclay and Warner 1993). On the other hand, institutional investors are less likely to 
break a large order into small trades since doing so can significantly reduce their trading 
profits.
7
 In contrast, while less wealthy individual investors may engage in medium-sized 
transactions, it is unlikely for them to trade in large blocks due to their wealth constraints. 
                                                 
6
 An alternative way to distinguish between small and large trades is to use the number of shares traded 
(Cready 1988; Cready and Mynatt 1991). Lee (1992) points out that proxies based on trade size are 
inherently noisy, as securities can trade in a wide price range. Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) find that 
dollar-value-based classification is less noisy in identifying trades made by small versus large investors. 
  
7
 Bhattacharya et al. (2007) offer three reasons why sophisticated institutional investors are unlikely to 
engage in small trades from fear of hurting their trading profit: (i) engaging in small trades will greatly 
increase transaction costs; (ii) a series of small orders from one account has the potential to induce a 
specialist to increase the spread; and (iii) breaking a large order into a series of small orders will require 
more time, during which other arbitrageurs can enter the market and erode trading profits. While these 
arguments may be less applicable since 2006, due to a significant reduction in transaction costs achieved by 
high-speed electronic processing offered by an advanced execution system, they are still valid for my 
sample period which ends in 2002. Moreover, if institutional investors' trades are misclassified as those of 
individual investors, it will bias against finding differential results between the two groups of investors.  
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Thus, inferring investor type is less ambiguous when there are small or large trades than 
when there are medium-sized trades. To reduce the noise in identifying small and large 
investors, I follow Bhattacharya (2001) and focus on large and small trades, eliminating 
the “buffer-zone” medium-sized trades.8  For each transaction day, I rely on the Lee-
Ready algorithm to infer the direction of trades (buy or sell). I calculate total trading 
volume, total number of trades, and net-buy for both individual and institutional investor 
classes.  
3.2 Event windows 
To test the impact of Reg FD on the information advantage of institutional 
investors, I focus on two windows around the filing of insider transactions: the pre-filing 
window and the post-filing window. The pre-filing window (Pre_File) starts 10 trading 
days before the insider transaction date and ends one day prior to the filing date of the 
transaction.
9
 In this window, information about the insider transaction is not publicly 
available. The post-filing window (Post_File) is a four-day period starting one day after 
the filing date of the insider transaction and ending four days after the filing date. In this 
window, the insider trading information becomes public.
10
 To capture abnormal trading 
                                                 
8
 Regrettably, direct data on institutional investors’ trading is not publicly available. Several papers use 
proprietary datasets which contain trading information as well as investor type (e.g., Taylor 2010, 2011; 
Kaniel et al. 2012; Cready et al. 2013). Institutional investors are required to report their stock ownership in 
quarterly 13-F filings but not their trading activities. As a consequence, I rely on high frequency TAQ data 
to capture trading activities around the filing date of insider trades. 
9
 Using an alternative window, from 5 days prior to the transaction date to one day before the filing date, 
obtains qualitatively similar results.  
 
10
 I also repeat the analyses using alternative intervals of (i) day 0 to day 2, (ii) day 0 to day 4, and (iii) day 
1 to day 2, where day 0 is the filing date. The overall tenor of the results does not change with these 
alternative windows.  
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activities in the pre-filing and the post-filing window, I measure normal trading activities 
using trades in a benchmark non-event window. The benchmark window is a 20-trading-
day period ending 10 trading days before the insider transaction date. To ensure that there 
is no major information event in the benchmark window, I exclude any day in the 
benchmark period that falls in a [-3, +3] window around an earnings announcement. The 
timeline of the event and benchmark windows is summarized in Figure 1. 
3.3 Abnormal trading volume around insider transactions 
 I construct two alternative measures of abnormal trading of large and small 
investors around insider transactions. Since the lengths of the pre-filing, the post-filing, 
and the benchmark windows are different, I examine the daily averages when measuring 
abnormal trading activity in each window.  
 Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Bhattacharya 2001), I use two measures of 
abnormal trading activity, one based on the number of shares traded and the other based 
on number of trades. For the measure based on number of shares traded, the normal 
trading volume is measured by the daily average trading volume of small (large) 
investors in the benchmark window. The abnormal trading volume of small (large) 
investors, AVOL_SML (AVOL_LRG), is computed as a firm’s daily average trading 
volume of small (large) investors in the pre- or the post-filing window minus the normal 
daily average trading volume of small (large) investors, scaled by the normal daily 
average trading volume of small (large) investors.
11
  
                                                 
11
 I also use the total number of trades in the benchmark window as an alternative deflator to construct the 
abnormal trading variables and obtain substantially similar results. 
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 For the measure based on number of trades, the normal number of trades is 
measured as the daily average number of trades of small (large) investors in the 
benchmark window. The abnormal number of trades of small (large) investors, 
ATRADE_SML (ATRADE_LRG), is computed as the daily average number of trades 
made by small (large) investors in the pre- or the post-filing window minus the normal 
daily average number of trades made by small (large) investors, scaled by the normal 
daily average number of trades made by small (large) investors. 
 I use the following models to test whether Reg FD changes the trading response 
of large and small investors around insider transactions: 
ATR_LRGWindow = α0+ α1POSTFD + α2PROFIT + α3POSTFD*PROFIT + 
α4MKTVOLWindow + α5SIZE + α6BM + α7PRET + 
α8AEARNSURPWindow+ α9TRADESIZE + α10REPORTLAG + ξL        (1) 
ATR_SMLWindow= β0 + β1POSTFD + β2PROFIT + β3POSTFD*PROFIT + 
β4MKTVOLWindow + β5SIZE + β6BM + β7PRET + β8AEARNSURPWindow 
+ β9TRADESIZE + β10REPORTLAG + ξS                                           (2) 
The dependent variable, ATR_LRG (ATR_SML), is either the abnormal trading 
volume, AVOL_LRG (AVOL_SML), or the abnormal number of trades, ATRADE_LRG 
(ATRADE_SML) in the pre-filing (Window = Pre-File) or the post-filing window 
(Window = Post-File) for large (small) investors. The profitability of an insider 
transaction is captured by PROFIT, an indicator variable equal to one if the 6-month buy-
and-hold market-adjusted stock return after an insider purchase (sale) is positive 
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(negative).
12
 If investors can distinguish information-driven insider trades (i.e., profitable 
insider transactions) in the pre-Reg FD period, the abnormal trading volume or number of 
trades should be positively associated with PROFIT. The variable POSTFD is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the insider trade date is after October 23, 2000 (the date 
Reg FD became effective), and zero otherwise. The coefficient on the interaction of 
PROFIT and POSTFD captures the change in the association between profitable insider 
trades and abnormal trading of large or small investors after the passage of Reg FD.  
H1a predicts the coefficient on PROFIT to be positive for large investors in the 
pre-filing window, since prior to the passage of Reg FD, institutional investors are likely 
to communicate privately with the management and obtain information on the insider 
trade or the underlying corporate event triggering the trade before the public filing of the 
trade. H1c predicts a positive coefficient on PROFIT for large investors in the post-filing 
window, either due to their access to private information or to their expertise in 
processing public information. H2a and H2c predict a negative coefficient on the 
interaction of PROFIT and POSTFD for large investors in the pre- and the post-filing 
windows, as the private communication channels between large investors and the 
management are likely blocked post Reg FD, curtailing the ability of institutional 
investors to obtain information and mimic profitable insider trades. Since small investors 
do not have access to private information both before and after Reg FD, I expect the 
coefficients on PROFIT and the interaction of PROFIT and POSTFD to be insignificant 
                                                 
12
 Following Huddart and Ke (2007), I choose a 6-month window to measure the profitability of insider 
trades. These authors argue that six months is the shortest possible trading horizon for an insider to make 
short-swing profits, consistent with the requirements of section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934. "Short-swing" is defined as a “round-trip” transaction (a purchase and a sale or a sale and a purchase) 
within six months. 
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for small investors in both the pre- and the post-filing windows.  
I include a number of control variables to capture other factors affecting 
investors’ trading behavior. Following prior research (e.g., Bamber et al. 1997; 
Bhattacharya 2001; Bhattacharya et al. 2007), I control for the market-wide trading 
volume (MKTVOL), computed as the daily average percentage of outstanding shares 
traded for all NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq firms. A firm’s information environment varies 
systematically with size. I therefore include firm size (SIZE) in the regression, where size 
equals the natural logarithm of market value of common equity at the end of the previous 
fiscal quarter. As in Rozeff and Zaman (1998) and Piotroski and Roulstone (2005), I 
include the book-to-market ratio (BM) and 6-month buy-and-hold market-adjusted 
returns prior to the trade date (PRET) to control for investor sentiment and contrarian 
beliefs. Absolute value of earnings surprise (AEARNSURP) is included to control for 
investors’ trading activities in response to an earnings announcement. The value of this 
variable is set to zero if there is no earnings announcement during the pre- and post-filing 
windows. Large insider trades can be more informative and trigger greater investor 
response. To ensure that my results are not driven by large insider trades, I include 
insider trade size (TRADESIZE) as a control variable, measured as the sum of shares 
traded as reported on each filing date scaled by the number of shares outstanding on the 
same day (Brochet 2010).
 13
 To control for varying lags in the filing of insider trades, I 
also include reporting lag (REPORTLAG) as an independent variable, measured as the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of trading days between the transaction date and 
the filing date. Appendix A summarizes the definitions of all variables. All continuous 
                                                 
13
 Insiders can report several transactions on the same Form 4 filing or file several Form 4s on the same day. 
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variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one-percent to mitigate the influence of 
outliers. Standard errors are clustered by firm. I include year fixed effects in the 
regressions to control for temporal changes in investors’ trading activities.  
Prior research finds that insider purchases and sales are inherently different, for 
example, in terms of profitability and information content (e.g., Ravina and Sapienza 
2010; Jagolinzer et al. 2011). Following the extant literature (e.g., Rozeff and Zaman 
1988; Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Jagolinzer 2009; Brochet 2010; Jagolinzer et al. 2011), 
I therefore partition the sample of insider trades by the direction of trading (buy versus 
sell) and estimate the regression model separately for each subsample. This approach 
allows me to examine whether my inferences are robust to both types of trades. 
3.4 Abnormal net-buying 
While it is informative to use measures of abnormal trading volume and number 
of trades to capture the magnitude of institutional and individual investors' trading around 
insider transactions, it is also important to test whether these investors trade in the same 
direction as the insider trade (i.e., sale or purchase). Thus, I also examine abnormal net-
buying activities to capture the directional response of small versus large investors. The 
abnormal net-buy measures are also calculated based on both the number of shares traded 
and the number of trades. Consistent with Ayers et al. (2011), the abnormal net-buy 
volume of small (large) investors, ANETVOL_SML (ANETVOL_LRG), is calculated as a 
firm’s average daily buy volume minus sell volume of small (large) investors in the pre- 
or post-filing window minus the firm-specific normal daily average net-buy volume of 
small (large) investors, scaled by the normal net-buy volume of these investors. The 
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normal net-buy volume is measured as the daily average buy volume minus sell volume 
of small (large) investors in the benchmark window. The abnormal net-buy measure 
based on the number of trades, ANETTRADE_SML (ANETTRADE_LRG), is computed 
similarly using the number of buy transactions minus the number of sell transactions in 
place of the net-buy volume.  
I estimate equations (3) and (4) to test whether Reg FD changes the directional 
trading response of large versus small investors around insider transactions. The 
regressions are estimated separately for insider purchases and insider sales. 
ANB_LRGWindow = γ0 + γ1POSTFD + γ2PROFIT + γ3POSTFD*PROFIT + 
γ4MKTVOLWindow + γ5SIZE + γ6BM + γ7PRET + γ8EARNSURPWindow + 
γ9TRADESIZE + γ10REPORTLAG + εL                                              (3) 
ANB_SMLWindow = θ0+ θ1POSTFD + θ2PROFIT + θ3POSTFD*PROFIT + 
θ4MKTVOLWindow + θ5SIZE + θ6BM + θ7PRET + θ8EARNSURPWindow 
+ θ9TRADESIZE + θ10REPORTLAG + εS                                          (4) 
The dependent variable, ANB_LRG (ANB_SML), is either the abnormal net-buy in 
terms of shares, ANETVOL_LRG (ANETVOL_SML), or the abnormal net-buy in terms of 
the number of trades, ANETTRADE_LRG (ANETTRADE_SML), in the pre-filing 
(Window= Pre-File) or the post-filing window (Window = Post-File) for large (small) 
investors. The explanatory variables are the same as in equations (1) and (2). The 
coefficient on PROFIT captures the association between profitable insider trades and 
abnormal buying of large or small investors before Reg FD, while the coefficient on the 
interaction of PROFIT and POSTFD captures the change in this association post Reg FD.  
  24 
If institutional investors have access to non-public information prior to Reg FD 
that helps them identify profitable insider trades, they will buy more (sell more) in 
response to profitable insider purchases (sales). Thus, for institutional investors prior to 
Reg FD, H1a and H1c predict the coefficient on PROFIT to be positive for insider 
purchases and negative for insider sales in the pre- and post-filing windows. If Reg FD 
successfully inhibits management from selectively disclosing non-public information to 
institutional investors, the ability of institutional investors to identify and mimic 
profitable insider trades is likely moderated post Reg FD. H2a and H2c predict the 
coefficient on the interaction of PROFIT and POSTFD to be negative for insider 
purchases and positive for insider sales. Since small investors do not have access to 
private information both before and after Reg FD, I expect the coefficients on PROFIT 
and the interaction of PROFIT and POSTFD to be insignificant for small investors in 
both the pre- and the post-filing windows.  
To contrast trading patterns of institutional investors directly with those of 
individual investors, I estimate the above regressions simultaneously for institutional and 
individual investors as seemingly unrelated regressions to facilitate a comparison of 
parameter estimates across investor groups. For both the test of abnormal trading volume 
and the test of abnormal buying, I compare the ability of institutional investors to mimic 
profitable insider trades to that of individual investors in the pre- and post-filing 
windows. 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Sample selection 
My sample includes insider trades occurring over the period 1996 to 2002. 
Specifically, my sample period ends on August 29, 2002, when the filing regulations 
relating to insider trades imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) became effective. 
This sample truncation avoids the confounding effects of SOX, since prior research has 
shown that the more timely filing requirements of SOX affected the informativeness of 
insider trades (Brochet 2010).   
I obtain intraday transaction data from the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database. 
TAQ covers trades and quotes of all securities listed on the NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ, 
and regional exchanges from 1993 onward. For each trade, TAQ provides the time of the 
transaction to the nearest second, price, volume and a trade condition code. Following the 
prior literature, I include trades occurring between 9:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. Eastern 
Standard Time (EST) in my analyses. Opening trades are excluded since they can be the 
sum of multiple orders. The NYSE and AMEX close at 4:00 p.m. EST. An extra 15 
minutes is allowed to pick up trades originating on the regional exchanges and trades 
reported late.   
Insider trading data is drawn from the Thomson Reuters insider trading database. 
I begin by extracting all insider trading transactions and keep only reliable records with a 
cleanse code of “R” (“data verified through the cleansing process”) or “H” (“cleansed 
with a very high level of confidence”). I include only open-market insider transactions in 
my analyses. Since the insider trading database contains a negligible number of open-
  26 
market insider observations prior to 1996, my sample period begins in the year 1996.
14
 I 
require a minimum transaction price of $2 per share and apply other standard data 
cleansing procedures used in the literature (e.g., Frankel and Li, 2004). Ravina and 
Sapienza (2010) find that trades made by top executives are more informative than those 
of other insiders. To increase the power of the test, I focus on insider trades of top 
executives (CEO, Chairman, CFO, COO, and President). Transactions an insider made on 
the same day and filed on the same date are aggregated. Insider trades that are filed late 
are excluded from the analysis.
15
 To ensure that the measurement of normal trading 
activity is not confounded by insider trading, I require no insider trading activity during 
the benchmark window. After eliminating observations with missing CRSP or Compustat 
data, my final sample includes 14,322 insider trades (5,009 firms).  
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for all dependent and explanatory 
variables. Of a total of 14,322 observations from 1996 to 2002, 3,803 observations 
(26.55%) are from the post-Reg FD period. Over half (52.25%) of the insider trades are 
profitable. For both the pre- and the post-filing window, the abnormal trading volume of 
institutional investors is significantly greater than that of individual investors. The mean 
(median) market-adjusted six-month buy-and-hold return prior to the insider transaction 
date is 3.22% (-3.76%). The mean and median reporting lags are 21 days. For about 51% 
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 As shown in subsequent sections, my results are robust to using 1998-2002 as the sample period.   
15
 Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, section 16(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 required that 
open-market trades by corporate insiders be reported to the SEC within 10 days after the end of the month 
in which they took place. This deadline was later changed to 2 days of the transaction date after 2002.   
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of insider trades, there is an earnings announcement in the pre-filing window; for only 
5% of insider trades, there is an earnings announcement in the post-filing window. 
Consistent with Brochet (2010), the average insider trading size reported on Form 4 is 
0.12% of total shares outstanding.   
4.3 Pre-filing window 
Tables 2-3 report the results of estimating equations (1)-(2) for the pre-filing 
window based on investors' abnormal trading volume. Table 4 reports the results of 
estimating equations (3)-(4) for the pre-filing window based on investors' abnormal net 
buying activity. In the pre-filing window, insider trading activities have not yet been filed 
with the SEC and therefore the information is not publicly available. 
4.3.1 Tests of abnormal trading volume   
Table 2 presents the estimation results of regressions (1) and (2), pooling all 
insider transactions. In column (1), I estimate equation (1) to examine the abnormal 
trading volume of institutional investors in the pre-filing window. The coefficient 
estimate on PROFIT, α2, is significantly positive at the 1% level, consistent with H1a. 
The positive α2 suggests that, in the pre-Reg FD period, trades of institutional investors 
have a higher association with profitable insider trades relative to unprofitable insider 
trades. This result is consistent with institutional investors having access to private 
information that helps them identify profitable insider trades or corporate events leading 
to the imminent insider trades, even before the public filing of such trades. The 
coefficient estimate on POSTFD*PROFIT, α3, is significantly negative at the 5% level, 
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indicating that the ability of institutional investors to trade on profitable insider 
transactions not yet publicly disclosed is diminished post Reg FD, consistent with H2a. 
The F-test (p=0.6054) cannot reject the null that the sum of the coefficient estimates on 
PROFIT and POSTFD*PROFIT, (α2+ α3), is zero, suggesting that the ability of 
institutional investors to mimic profitable insider trades becomes insignificant in the post-
Reg FD period. 
Column (2) reports the estimation results of equation (2) examining the abnormal 
trading volume of individual investors in the pre-filing window. The coefficient estimate 
on PROFIT, β2, is insignificantly different from zero, consistent with H1b that individual 
investors do not have access to private information in the pre-filing window and therefore 
do not respond to the undisclosed event. The coefficient estimate on POSTFD*PROFIT, 
β3, is insignificantly different from zero in column (2), indicating no change in the ability 
of individual investors to mimic profitable insider trades in the post-Reg FD period, 
consistent with H2b. The F-test (p=0.7544) cannot reject the null that the sum of the 
coefficient estimates on PROFIT and POSTFD*PROFIT, (β2+ β3), is zero for individual 
investors. Thus, these results suggest that individual investors do not have access to 
private information about insider trades in the pre- as well as the post-Reg FD periods.  
To evaluate whether Reg FD has successfully leveled the playing field between 
institutional and individual investors in the pre-filing window, I estimate equations (1) 
and (2) simultaneously using seemingly unrelated regression estimation. I compare the 
ability of institutional investors to identify profitable insider trades to that of individual 
investors both pre- and post-Reg FD. The coefficient α2 (β2) captures the ability of 
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institutional (individual) investors to identify profitable insider trades in the pre-filing 
window pre-Reg FD, while α2 + α3 (β2 + β3) captures their ability in the post-Reg FD 
period. For the pre-Reg FD period, the null that α2 equals β2 is rejected at the 1% level, 
suggesting that institutional investors possess private information and are therefore more 
capable of trading on profitable insider trades before its public filing. In contrast, for the 
post-Reg FD period, I cannot reject the null that (α2 + α3) is equal to (β2 + β3), indicating 
that Reg FD eliminated the information advantage of institutional investors in the pre-
filing window. In columns (3) and (4), I conduct the same tests using the abnormal 
number of trades instead of the abnormal number of shares to capture investors’ trading 
behavior and obtain the same inferences as in columns (1) and (2). 
The coefficient estimates on the control variables are generally in line with 
expectations and consistent with previous studies (e.g., Bhattacharya 2001; Brochet 
2010). Both institutional and individual investors’ abnormal trading activities are 
positively associated with market-wide trading volume (MKTVOL). Insider trades in 
small firms and large-sized insider trades trigger greater abnormal trading response from 
investors. As expected, longer reporting lags are associated with a lower abnormal 
trading response.  
Table 3 reports the regression results of equations (1) and (2) estimated separately 
for insider purchases (panel A) and insider sales (panel B) in the pre-filing window. Both 
panels yield the same inferences as the results of the pooled sample in Table 2. For 
institutional investors, in the pre-filing window, the coefficient estimate on PROFIT is 
significantly positive, while the coefficient estimate on POSTFD*PROFIT is 
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significantly negative (column 1) for both insider purchases and sales. F-tests fail to 
reject the null that the sum of the two coefficient estimates is zero in both panels, 
suggesting that Reg FD diminishes the ability of institutional investors to obtain private 
information and trade on profitable insider transactions. In contrast, for individual 
investors, regardless of the direction of insider trades, the coefficient estimates on 
PROFIT and POSTFD*PROFIT are always insignificantly different from zero (column 
2). The results of the seemingly unrelated regression analysis indicate that institutional 
investors have an information advantage over individual investors in the pre-Reg FD 
period, as their abnormal trading volume and number of trades are significantly more 
positively correlated with profitable insider transactions. For the post-Reg FD period, on 
the other hand, I cannot reject the null that institutional and individual investors are 
equally uninformed about the imminent insider trades or their profitability and therefore 
do not exhibit abnormal trading response to profitable insider trades. These results 
indicate that the general inferences from Table 2 apply to both insider purchases and 
insider sales. 
4.3.2 Tests of abnormal net-buying activity 
Table 4 reports the results of estimating equations (3) and (4) for the pre-filing 
period. Instead of using non-directional abnormal trading measures, I examine whether 
the direction of abnormal trading (i.e., net buying) by institutional and individual 
investors is correlated with that of profitable insider purchases and sales. Informed 
investors react differently to profitable insider purchases and sales, buying more in 
response to profitable insider purchases while selling more in response to profitable 
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insider sales. To capture this effect, equations (3) and (4) are estimated separately for 
insider purchases and sales. Panel A (B) reports the regression results for the insider 
purchase (sale) sample. I report the results of equation (3) for institutional investors in 
columns (1) and (3), with share-based abnormal net-buy being the dependent variable in 
column (1) and trade-based abnormal net-buy being the dependent variable in column 
(3). For the insider purchase (sale) sample, the coefficient estimate on PROFIT in 
columns (1) and (3) is significantly positive (negative), indicating that institutional 
purchases (sales) have a higher association with profitable insider purchases (sales) 
relative to unprofitable insider purchases (sales). These results are consistent with H1a 
and provide further support for the argument that the abnormal trading activities of 
institutional investors are based on their access to private managerial information. 
Consistent with H2a, the coefficient estimate on POSTFD*PROFIT is significantly 
negative for insider purchases and significantly positive for insider sales, suggesting a 
diminishing effect of Reg FD on institutional investors’ ability to mimic profitable insider 
transactions. The F-test of the sum of the coefficient estimates on PROFIT and 
POSTFD*PROFIT suggests that institutional investors lack the ability to trade in the 
same direction as profitable insider transactions in the post-Reg FD period. In contrast, 
the coefficient estimates on PROFIT and POSTFD*PROFIT for individual investors are 
insignificant for insider purchases and sales (consistent with H1b and H2b). Results of a 
seemingly unrelated regression analysis indicate that, while institutional investors exhibit 
a stronger ability to mimic profitable insider trades than individual investors before Reg 
FD, their superior ability disappears post Reg FD.  
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Pre-filing window: Summary of results 
Taken together, for the pre-filing window, when there is no public disclosure of 
insider trading activities, I find evidence consistent with institutional investors having 
access to nonpublic information pre-Reg FD, which enables them to mimic profitable 
insider trades. The private communication between institutional investors and 
management creates an unlevel playing field, leaving individual investors disadvantaged. 
With the passage of Reg FD, institutional investors’ information advantage appears to 
have diminished, consistent with Reg FD effectively blocking the private communication 
channel.  
4.4 Post-filing window 
Tables 5-6 report the results of estimating equations (1)-(2) for the post-filing 
window based on investors' abnormal trading volume. Table 7 reports the results of 
estimating equations (3)-(4) for the post-filing window based on investors' abnormal net-
buying activity. In the post-filing window, information on insider trading activities is 
publicly available. Superior ability to identify and mimic profitable insider trades after 
the public disclosure of insider trades can be either due to having access to private 
information or having the expertise to process public information. If institutional 
investors rely at least partly on private information access, Reg FD should affect their 
ability to identify profitable insider trades in the post-filing window.  
4.4.1 Tests of abnormal trading volume   
Table 5 presents the estimation results of equations (1) and (2) in the post-filing 
  33 
window, pooling all insider transactions. Equation (1) is estimated for large investors in 
columns (1) and (3), with the dependent variable being abnormal trading volume and 
abnormal number of trades respectively. Consistent with H1c, the coefficient estimate on 
PROFIT, α2, is significantly positive in both column (1) and column (3), suggesting that 
institutional investors can identify profitable insider trades in the post-filing window pre-
Reg FD. As predicted by H2c, the coefficient estimate on POSTFD*PROFIT, α3, is 
significantly negative in both columns, indicating that the ability of institutional investors 
to identify and mimic profitable insider trades in the post-filing window is significantly 
reduced after the passage of Reg FD. In fact, the F-tests cannot reject the null that the 
sum of the coefficient estimates on PROFIT and POSTFD*PROFIT, (α2 + α3), is zero. As 
the expertise of institutional investors and the set of public information are likely 
unchanged around Reg FD, these results suggest that institutional investors acquire 
private information in the post-filing window that enables them to identify profitable 
insider trades pre-Reg FD, but this information channel is blocked post-Reg FD.  
Equation (2) is estimated for small investors in columns (2) and (4) using the two 
alternative abnormal trading volume measures. Neither the coefficient estimate on 
PROFIT, β2, nor the coefficient estimate on POSTFD*PROFIT, β3, is significant, 
consistent with H1d and H2d, respectively. As indicated by the F-test, the sum of the two 
coefficient estimates is also insignificant. The results indicate that individual investors' 
trades do not exhibit an ability to distinguish profitable insider trades from unprofitable 
trades both in the pre- and the post-Reg FD periods.  
Using seemingly unrelated regression estimation, I also compare the ability of 
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institutional investors to identify profitable insider transactions with that of individual 
investors in the post-filing window both pre- and post-Reg FD. For the pre-Reg FD 
period, the null that the coefficients on PROFIT are the same for institutional and 
individual investors is rejected at the 1% level, indicating that institutional investors are 
more capable of identifying and mimicking profitable insider trades than individual 
investors in the post-filing window. In contrast, for the post-Reg FD period, I cannot 
reject the null that institutional and individual investors have the same ability to identify 
and mimic profitable insider trades, i.e., (α2 + α3) is equal to (β2 + β3). This finding 
suggests that Reg FD mitigated the information advantage of institutional investors in the 
post-filing window. Thus, from the post-Reg FD results, it appears that the superior 
ability of institutional investors pre-Reg FD largely came from their access to managerial 
private information. 
Table 6 reports the results of equations (1) and (2) estimated separately for insider 
purchases (Panel A) and sales (Panel B) in the post-filing window. For institutional 
investors, the coefficient estimates on PROFIT are significantly positive in both panels, 
columns (1) and (3). However, there is mixed evidence regarding whether Reg FD 
reduced the ability of institutional investors to identify profitable insider trades in the 
post-filing window. While the coefficient estimates on POSTFD*PROFIT are 
significantly negative in columns (1) and (3) of Panel B for the insider sales sample, the 
coefficient estimates on POSTFD*PROFIT are insignificant in columns (1) and (3) of 
Panel A for the insider purchases sample. Thus, it appears that Reg FD diminished 
institutional investors' ability to distinguish profitable from unprofitable insider sales but 
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did not impact their ability to distinguish profitable insider purchases. In the case of 
individual investors, I find that while these investors do not have the ability to mimic 
profitable insider sales, there is evidence of some ability to mimic profitable insider 
purchases, both in the pre- and the post-Reg FD periods. While both investor groups 
successfully mimic profitable insider purchases, a seemingly unrelated regression 
analysis suggests that the mimicking ability of institutional investors is (weakly) greater 
than that of individual investors after the passage of Reg FD (one-tail p-value = 0.0767). 
Thus, it appears that Reg FD may not have completely blocked the private information 
access of institutional investors. 
4.4.2 Tests of abnormal net-buying activity 
Table 7 reports the estimation results of equations (3) and (4) for the post-filing 
window, examining whether the direction of abnormal trading (i.e., net buying) is 
correlated with that of profitable insider transactions. Panel A (B) reports the regression 
results for the insider purchase (sale) sample. Again, I report the results of equation (3) 
for institutional investors in columns (1) and (3), with the share-based and the trade-based 
abnormal net-buy measure as the dependent variable, respectively. For the insider 
purchase (sale) sample, the coefficient estimates on PROFIT in columns (1) and (3) are 
both significantly positive (negative) at the 1% level, indicating more institutional 
purchases (sales) in response to profitable insider purchases (sales) in the post-filing 
window. Similar to the results in Table 6, the coefficient estimates on POSTFD*PROFIT 
in columns (1) and (3) are both significantly negative in the insider sale panel but 
insignificantly different from zero in the insider purchase panel. While the sum of the 
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coefficient estimates on PROFIT and POSTFD*PROFIT is insignificant in the insider 
sale panel, it is significant at the 5% level in columns (1) and (3) of the insider purchase 
panel. Thus, while Reg FD diminishes the ability of institutional investors to distinguish 
profitable from unprofitable insider sales, it does not appear to have an impact on their 
ability to distinguish profitable insider purchases.  
The coefficient estimate on PROFIT for individual investors in columns (2) and 
(4) of the insider purchase panel (Panel A) is also weakly significantly positive, 
indicating that to some extent individual investors were also able to identify and mimic 
profitable insider purchases in the pre-Reg FD period. However, their ability to 
distinguish profitable insider purchases was not as strong as that of institutional investors. 
Interestingly, the ability of institutional investors to mimic profitable insider purchases is 
not different from that of individual investors after the passage of Reg FD. Thus, 
although I do not find a significant decline in institutional investors' ability to distinguish 
profitable insider purchases in the post-Reg FD period, their overall ability to track 
profitable insider purchases becomes similar to that of individual investors. 
Post-filing window: Summary of results 
In summary, for the post-filing window in which the information about insider 
trading activities is public, I find that institutional investors are able to identify and mimic 
profitable insider trades pre-Reg FD while individual investors are less capable of doing 
so. The ability of institutional investors to track profitable insider sales is significantly 
reduced post-Reg FD, suggesting that access to managerial private information is an 
important explanation of their superior ability to identify profitable insider sales in the 
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pre-Reg FD period. On the other hand, the ability of institutional investors to track 
profitable insider purchases appears to be unaffected by Reg FD. Similar to the results in 
Table 6, I find that the net-buying behavior of institutional investors in response to 
profitable insider purchases is (weakly) better than that of individual investors in the 
post-Reg FD period (one-tail p-value = 0.0453). Thus, it is likely that Reg FD may not 
have completely eliminated institutional investors' information advantage. 
It is also possible that institutional investors' superior ability to identify profitable 
insider purchases after Reg FD may be due to their expertise in information collection, 
processing and analysis. The same superior ability may not apply to mimicking insider 
sales because of the differential information content of insider purchases versus insider 
sales. A number of studies document that insider purchases are more likely information 
driven and are more profitable on average, whereas insider sales can be motivated by 
other considerations unrelated to information, such as diversification and liquidity 
demand of insiders (e.g., Jagolinzer 2009; Brochet 2010; Jagolinzer et al. 2011). 
Motivated by the greater profit potential associated with insider purchases, institutional 
investors may be more willing to invest in research after observing insider purchases 
rather than sales. It would also be less challenging to isolate profitable insider trades 
among purchases since motivations behind purchases are less confounded by other non-
information-related considerations. Consequently, even absent private information 
access, the expertise of institutional investors may have enabled them to identify and 
mimic profitable insider purchases post-Reg FD.  
Overall, while it is possible that the superior mimicking ability of institutional 
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investors in relation to profitable insider purchases in the post Reg-FD period is due to 
their own incentives and expertise in information processing, the alternative explanation, 
that Reg FD was not fully successful in blocking selective disclosures, cannot be ruled 
out.  
4.5 Robustness tests 
I conduct several sensitivity tests and find my inferences from the results in 
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 to be robust. First, to address the concern that insiders are more 
likely to disclose their trading activities to institutional investors after they themselves 
have already traded, instead of the pre-filing window used earlier, I use an alternative 
window, the post-trading-pre-filing window (Trade_File), which starts the day after the 
insider transaction date and ends one day prior to the filing date of the transaction. 
Results are shown in Table 8 to Table 10 and are consistent with the results for the pre-
filing window used earlier. I find that institutional investors have a significant ability to 
mimic profitable insider trades and this ability declines post Reg FD. Individual 
investors, on the other hand, do not exhibit an ability to mimic profitable insider trades, 
either pre or post Reg FD. Thus, the results with this alternative pre-filing window are 
consistent with those reported earlier in all respects. 
Second, the post-Reg FD sample is smaller than the pre-Reg FD sample, which 
leads to a potential concern that the lack of significant results in the post-Reg FD period 
is driven by the lack of power due to the smaller sample size. To mitigate this concern, I 
repeat my analyses for the 1998-2002 period using roughly similar sized pre-Reg FD and 
post-Reg FD samples. I find that my results are substantially the same. 
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Third, my results are robust to extending the sample period to the post-SOX 
period. SOX imposes more timely filing requirements on insider trades after August 2002 
and thus affects the informativeness of insider trade filings (Brochet, 2010). While my 
main analyses are based on the sample before SOX to avoid its potential confounding 
effects, my inferences are unchanged even if the analyses is conducted over a longer 
period -- 1996-2005.
16
  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The effects of Reg FD have been researched by prior studies, but the results so far are 
inconclusive as to whether it truly leveled the informational playing field. This paper 
focuses on institutional investors, a key target of Reg FD and investigates whether Reg 
FD has been successful in leveling the playing field between institutional and individual 
investors in terms of their ability to distinguish and profit from information-driven insider 
trades.   
I examine the abnormal trading behavior of institutional and individual investors 
in the pre-filing window, when information about the insider trade is not publicly 
disclosed, and in the post-filing window, when such information is publicly available. For 
the pre-filing window, I find that, prior to Reg FD, institutional investors are capable of 
distinguishing profitable insider trades from unprofitable trades, as evidenced by the 
association of their trades with profitable insider trades and in the same direction as 
                                                 
16
 Since the massive magnitude of TAQ data from 2006 onward requires substantial computing power, I 
end my sample period in 2005 for the purpose of this sensitivity analysis.  
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profitable insider trades. In contrast, individual investors do not exhibit the same trading 
pattern in the pre-filing window. Institutional investors' superior ability to distinguish 
profitable insider trades may either stem from their superior private information access or 
their superior expertise in information processing. For example, it is possible that, if there 
are more earnings announcements in the pre-filing window (since insiders are more likely 
to trade after earnings announcements due to black-out period restrictions), both insiders 
and institutional investors may trade on the same earnings information leading to the 
observed higher association. On the other hand, I find that, after the passage of Reg FD, 
the ability of institutional investors to identify profitable insider trades in the pre-filing 
window is diminished. This suggests that institutional investors had private access to 
managerial information about insider trades or the corporate events that triggered the 
imminent insider trade in the pre-Reg FD period and that they lost that private access 
after the passage of Reg FD.   
For the post-filing window, I also find that institutional investors are able to 
identify and mimic profitable insider trades in the pre-Reg FD period, while individual 
investors are less capable of doing so. Similar to the pre-filing window, the institutional 
investors' advantage can come either from their access to managerial private information 
or from their expertise in information processing. I find that, the ability of institutional 
investors to mimic profitable insider sales is largely diminished after Reg FD, suggesting 
that private communication with management, which is blocked by Reg FD, was an 
important source of their superior ability to identify profitable insider sales in the pre-Reg 
FD period. On the other hand, I find that institutional investors' ability to identify and 
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mimic profitable insider purchases remains unaffected after Reg FD. Interestingly, I find 
that even individual investors exhibit the ability to mimic profitable insider purchases 
both in the pre- and post-Reg FD periods. These results together suggest that investors 
may be able to distinguish profitable insider purchases by applying their own expertise in 
information collection and processing. However, I find that the ability of institutional 
investors in mimicking profitable insider purchases is (weakly) better than that of 
individual investors. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that Reg FD may not have 
successfully blocked private communication between institutional investors and corporate 
management. These results could be useful to the SEC in supporting its recent revamping 
efforts toward better enforcement of Reg FD after a four-year long hiatus in Reg FD 
enforcement actions.      
Overall, my findings suggest that Reg FD was largely effective in eliminating 
selective disclosures of material nonpublic information, reducing institutional investors’ 
information advantage, and leveling the playing field between individual and institutional 
investors.  
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Figure 1 
Timeline around Insider Trades 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: This figure presents a timeline explaining the alternative windows surrounding an 
insider trade over which outside investors’ abnormal trading is measured. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
              
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 
POSTFD 14,322 0.2655 0.4416 0 0 1 
PROFIT 14,322 0.5226 0.4995 0 1 1 
AVOL_SMLPre_File 14,322 0.3764 1.1839 -0.2071 0.0758 0.5226 
AVOL_LRGPre_File 14,322 0.8438 2.6609 -0.3639 0.0952 0.9268 
ATRADE_SMLPre_File 14,322 0.3105 1.0087 -0.2005 0.0710 0.4679 
ATRADE_LRGPre_File 14,322 0.5442 1.7900 -0.3311 0.0662 0.7188 
AVOL_SMLPost_File 14,322 0.3635 1.4071 -0.3746 -0.0049 0.5789 
AVOL_LRGPost_File 14,322 0.6194 3.1247 -0.7605 -0.2527 0.5993 
ATRADE_SMLPost_File 14,322 0.2882 1.2160 -0.3582 -0.0038 0.5 
ATRADE_LRGPost_File 14,322 0.4373 2.2619 -0.6981 -0.1867 0.5630 
MKTVOLPre_File 14,322 0.0056 0.0011 0.0047 0.0052 0.0066 
MKTVOLPost_File 14,322 0.0056 0.0012 0.0047 0.0051 0.0067 
SIZE 14,322 5.8690 1.5225 4.7568 5.7820 6.8259 
BM 14,322 0.5114 0.3932 0.2383 0.4229 0.6795 
PRET 14,322 0.0322 0.4829 -0.2577 -0.0376 0.2075 
EARNSURPPre_File 14,322 -0.0006 0.0204 0 0 0.0004 
EARNSURPPost_File 14,322 0.0000 0.0013 0 0 0 
TRADESIZE 14,322 0.0012 0.0024 0.0001 0.0003 0.0012 
REPORTLAG 14,322 21.4114 10.0684 13 21 30 
 
The table reports descriptive statistics relating to the variables of interest for the sample of 14,322 insider 
trade observations over the period 1996- (August) 2002. The variables are defined in the Appendix.  
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Table 2 
Effect of Reg FD on the Trading Response to Insider Trades  
in the Pre-filing Window 
 
ATR_LRGPre_File = α0+ α1POSTFD + α2PROFIT + α3POSTFD*PROFIT + α4MKTVOLPre_File 
+ α5SIZE + α6BM + α7PRET + α8AEARNSURPPre_File + α9TRADESIZE + 
α10REPORTLAG + ξL                                                                                (1)                                                                                                                                
ATR_SMLPre_File = β0+ β1POSTFD + β2PROFIT + β3POSTFD*PROFIT + β4MKTVOLPre_File 
+ β5SIZE + β6BM + β7PRET + β8AEARNSURPPre_File + β9TRADESIZE + 
β10REPORTLAG + ξS                                                                                (2)                                                                                                                                  
  
 AVOLPre_File  ATRADEPre_File 
 Large  Small  Large  Small 
 Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate 
 (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value) 
Intercept 0.8712**  0.1143  -0.3627  -0.0743 
 (0.0347)  (0.4779)  (0.1324)  (0.5773) 
POSTFD 0.1648  0.0243  0.0150  0.0135 
 (0.2401)  (0.5933)  (0.8500)  (0.7213) 
PROFIT 0.1999***  -0.0355  0.1781***  0.0072 
 (0.0001)  (0.1761)  (<.0001)  (0.7416) 
POSTFD*PROFIT -0.2469**  0.0264  -0.2183***  -0.0063 
 (0.0199)  (0.5027)  (0.0004)  (0.8496) 
MKTVOLPre_File 195.1318***  116.2003***  199.2032***  113.1966*** 
 (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
SIZE -0.2143***  -0.0586***  -0.1090***  -0.0579*** 
 (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
BM -0.0113  -0.1840***  -0.0919*  -0.1250*** 
 (0.8856)  (<.0001)  (0.0725)  (<.0001) 
PRET -0.0830*  -0.1740***  0.1221***  -0.0660*** 
 (0.0772)  (<.0001)  (0.0010)  (0.0013) 
AEARNSURPPre_File -0.8537  1.0977*  0.7512  0.4158 
 (0.5484)  (0.0918)  (0.4317)  (0.4307) 
TRADESIZE 68.8006***  11.5072**  72.1270***  17.7827*** 
 (<.0001)  (0.0322)  (<.0001)  (0.0001) 
REPORTLAG -0.1249***  -0.0871***  -0.0455  -0.0538*** 
 (0.0082)  (<.0001)  (0.1344)  (0.0026) 
        
R
2 
2.69%  2.33%  3.59%  2.30% 
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F-test
a
 α2 + α3  β2 + β3  α2 + α3  β2 + β3 
P-value 0.6054   0.7544   0.4299   0.9719 
        
        
   P-value    P-value 
Pre-Reg FD
b: test if α2 = β2  0.0001    0.0001 
       
Post-Reg FD
c: test if α2 + α3 = β2 + β3                                    0.6382    0.4264 
      
 
This table reports results of regressions (1) and (2) in columns (1) and (3), and columns (2) and (4), 
respectively, for the sample of 14,322 insider trade observations. The regressions are estimated with year 
fixed effects. The dependent variable, ATR_LRGPre_File, equals AVOL_LRGPre_File in column (1) and 
ATRADE_LRGPre_File in column (3). The dependent variable, ATR_SMLPre_File, equals AVOL_SMLPre_File 
in column (2) and ATRADE_SMLPre_File in column (4). Variables are defined in the Appendix. P-values 
relate to t-statistics corrected for clustering of standard errors by firm and are reported in parentheses below 
the related coefficient estimates.  
 
a
 F-test of the investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable insider trades in the post-Reg FD 
period.  
b
 F-test of the difference between large versus small investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable 
insider trades in the Pre-Reg FD period, using seemingly unrelated regression estimation.   
c
 F-test of the difference between large versus small investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable 
insider trades in the Post-Reg FD period, using seemingly unrelated regression estimation.   
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Table 3 
Effect of Reg FD on the Trading Response to Insider Trades in the Pre-filing 
Window Estimated Separately for Insider Purchases and Insider Sales 
 
ATR_LRGPre_File = α0+ α1POSTFD + α2PROFIT + α3POSTFD*PROFIT + α4MKTVOLPre_File 
+ α5SIZE + α6BM + α7PRET + α8AEARNSURPPre_File + α9TRADESIZE + 
α10REPORTLAG + ξL                                                                                (1)                                                                                                                                  
ATR_SMLPre_File = β0+ β1POSTFD + β2PROFIT + β3POSTFD*PROFIT + β4MKTVOLPre_File 
+ β5SIZE + β6BM + β7PRET + β8AEARNSURPPre_File + β9TRADESIZE + 
β10REPORTLAG + ξS                                                                                (2)                                                                                                                                 
 
Panel A: Insider Purchases 
  
 AVOLPre_File  ATRADEPre_File 
 Large  Small  Large  Small 
 Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate 
 (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value) 
Intercept 0.3769  -0.1344  -0.5254  -0.3015* 
 (0.5619)  (0.5654)  (0.1144)  (0.0995) 
POSTFD 0.3449  0.0766  0.0921  0.0140 
 (0.1954)  (0.3182)  (0.4564)  (0.8122) 
PROFIT 0.1974**  -0.0037  0.1330***  0.0118 
 (0.0135)  (0.9293)  (0.0061)  (0.7179) 
POSTFD*PROFIT -0.3654*  -0.0257  -0.2108**  -0.0020 
 (0.0707)  (0.7190)  (0.0464)  (0.9709) 
MKTVOLPre_File 220.5285***  116.6926***  167.2535***  111.7687*** 
 (0.0012)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
SIZE -0.1530***  0.0025  -0.0487***  -0.0012 
 (<.0001)  (0.8469)  (0.0007)  (0.9023) 
BM 0.0229  -0.2843***  0.0766  -0.1511*** 
 (0.8092)  (<.0001)  (0.1758)  (<.0001) 
PRET -0.0456  -0.1529***  0.1010*  -0.0257 
 (0.5777)  (0.0007)  (0.0560)  (0.4837) 
AEARNSURPPre_File -2.5946  0.7181  -0.4276  0.2031 
 (0.1289)  (0.3869)  (0.6637)  (0.7543) 
TRADESIZE 33.1406  18.2308  22.4443  10.9684 
 (0.2056)  (0.1206)  (0.1501)  (0.2505) 
REPORTLAG -0.1358**  -0.0962***  -0.0923**  -0.0777*** 
 (0.0370)  (0.0020)  (0.0196)  (0.0013) 
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R
2 
1.26%  2.36%  1.46%  1.95% 
        
F-test
a
 α2 + α3  β2 + β3  α2 + α3  β2 + β3 
P-value 0.3624  0.6074  0.405  0.8244 
        
        
   P-value    P-value 
Pre-Reg FD
b: test if α2 = β2                                    0.0077    0.0052 
        
Post-Reg FD
c: test if α2 + α3 = β2 + β3                                    0.3198    0.2751 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Insider Sales 
  
 AVOLPre_File  ATRADEPre_File 
 Large  Small  Large  Small 
 Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate 
 (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value) 
Intercept 1.3208***  -0.1862  0.1157  -0.1383 
 (0.0065)  (0.3663)  (0.7295)  (0.4663) 
POSTFD 0.0799  0.0850  -0.0959  0.0593 
 (0.5586)  (0.2182)  (0.3950)  (0.2567) 
PROFIT 0.1749***  0.0362  0.1214**  0.0433 
 (0.0072)  (0.2298)  (0.0232)  (0.1282) 
POSTFD*PROFIT -0.2286**  -0.0553  -0.1392*  -0.0540 
 (0.0492)  (0.2164)  (0.0932)  (0.2104) 
MKTVOLPre_File 143.5416***  98.6434***  235.7119***  108.1024*** 
 (0.0052)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
SIZE -0.2647***  -0.0816***  -0.1931***  -0.0967*** 
 (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
BM -0.0342  -0.1024*  -0.2248**  -0.1005** 
 (0.8065)  (0.0547)  (0.0252)  (0.0474) 
PRET -0.1322**  -0.1097***  0.0193  -0.0661** 
 (0.0308)  (0.0001)  (0.7145)  (0.0116) 
AEARNSURPPre_File 3.5155  1.0289  5.3801***  1.0133 
 (0.1733)  (0.3033)  (0.0087)  (0.2551) 
TRADESIZE 81.0744***  23.1869***  69.8554***  24.3823*** 
 (<.0001)  (0.0002)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
REPORTLAG -0.0642  0.0403*  -0.0455  0.0354 
 (0.3037)  (0.0915)  (0.3158)  (0.1244) 
        
R
2 
5.16%  3.25%  6.13%  4.35% 
        
F-test
a
 α2 + α3  β2 + β3  α2 + α3  β2 + β3 
P-value 0.5728   0.5603   0.7793   0.7386 
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   P-value    P-value 
Pre-Reg FD
b: test if α2 = β2 0.0310    0.0923 
        
Post-Reg FD
c: test if α2 + α3 = β2 + β3 0.7234    0.9199 
        
 
This table reports results of regression (1) and (2) in columns (1) and (3), and columns (2) and (4), 
respectively, for the sample of 7,131 insider purchases (in Panel A) and 7,191 insider sales (in Panel B). 
The regressions are estimated with year fixed effects. The dependent variable, ATR_LRGPre_File, equals 
AVOL_LRGPre_File in column (1) and ATRADE_LRGPre_File in column (3). The dependent variable, 
ATR_SMLPre_File, equals AVOL_SMLPre_File in column (2) and ATRADE_SMLPre_File in column (4). 
Variables are defined in the Appendix. P-values relate to t-statistics corrected for clustering of standard 
errors by firm and are reported in parentheses below the related coefficient estimates.  
 
a
 F-test of the investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable insider trades in the post-Reg FD 
period.  
b
 F-test of the difference between large versus small investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable 
insider trades in the Pre-Reg FD period, using seemingly unrelated regression estimation.   
c
 F-test of the difference between large versus small investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable 
insider trades in the Post-Reg FD period, using seemingly unrelated regression estimation.   
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Table 4 
Effect of Reg FD on the Net-buying Response to Insider Trades in the Pre-filing 
Window Estimated Separately for Insider Purchases and Insider Sales 
 
ANB_LRGPre_File = γ0 + γ1POSTFD + γ2PROFIT + γ3POSTFD*PROFIT + γ4MKTVOLPre_File + 
γ5SIZE + γ6BM + γ7PRET + γ8EARNSURPPre_File + γ9TRADESIZE + 
γ10REPORTLAG + εL                                                                                (3) 
ANB_SMLPre_File = θ0 + θ1POSTFD + θ2PROFIT + θ3POSTFD*PROFIT + θ4MKTVOLPre_File 
+ θ5SIZE + θ6BM + θ7PRET + θ8EARNSURPPre_File + θ9TRADESIZE + 
θ10REPORTLAG + εS                                                                                (4)  
 
Panel A: Insider Purchases 
  
 ANETVOLPre_File  ANETTRADEPre_File 
 Large  Small  Large  Small 
 Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate 
 (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value) 
Intercept -0.2290  0.0540  -0.1100  0.0412 
 (0.3231)  (0.3669)  (0.4140)  (0.4589) 
POSTFD 0.0872  -0.0257  0.0308  -0.0215 
 (0.3131)  (0.1707)  (0.5371)  (0.2291) 
PROFIT 0.0681**  0.0053  0.0325*  0.0013 
 (0.0338)  (0.6208)  (0.0794)  (0.8903) 
POSTFD*PROFIT -0.1420**  0.0089  -0.0734*  0.0146 
 (0.0277)  (0.6040)  (0.0650)  (0.3380) 
MKTVOLPre_File -15.3292  -9.4158  -0.2695  -4.6432 
 (0.5714)  (0.1704)  (0.9851)  (0.4601) 
SIZE 0.0310***  0.0084***  0.0034  0.0020 
 (0.0023)  (0.0078)  (0.5889)  (0.4862) 
BM -0.0384  -0.0091  -0.0096  -0.0085 
 (0.3503)  (0.3471)  (0.6913)  (0.3321) 
PRET 0.0051  -0.0416***  -0.0056  -0.0359*** 
 (0.8648)  (<.0001)  (0.7547)  (<.0001) 
EARNSURPPre_File -0.3898  -0.0854  -0.5069  -0.0007 
 (0.5204)  (0.6389)  (0.1891)  (0.9966) 
TRADESIZE -13.9237  2.0519  2.9204  1.3203 
 (0.1777)  (0.4875)  (0.6316)  (0.6113) 
REPORTLAG 0.0307  -0.0027  0.0293**  0.0004 
 (0.1771)  (0.7255)  (0.0316)  (0.9525) 
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R
2 
0.568%  1.18%  0.256%  1.02% 
        
F-test
a γ2 + γ3  θ2 + θ3  γ2 + γ3  θ2 + θ3 
P-value 0.2086   0.4258   0.2471   0.3198 
        
        
   P-value    P-value 
Pre-Reg FD
b: test if γ2 = θ2 0.0612    0.1145 
        
Post-Reg FD
c: test if γ2 + γ3 = θ2 + θ3 0.1834    0.2215 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Insider Sales 
  
 ANETVOLPre_File  ANETTRADEPre_File 
 Large  Small  Large  Small 
 Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate 
 (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value) 
Intercept -0.0428  -0.0924  -0.1759*  -0.1004* 
 (0.7928)  (0.1247)  (0.0896)  (0.0846) 
POSTFD -0.0420  0.0057  -0.0329  0.0115 
 (0.4174)  (0.7601)  (0.3065)  (0.5276) 
PROFIT -0.0509**  0.0008  -0.0308**  0.0072 
 (0.0208)  (0.9280)  (0.0342)  (0.4199) 
POSTFD*PROFIT 0.0705*  -0.0018  0.0426*  -0.0085 
 (0.0629)  (0.8942)  (0.0828)  (0.5305) 
MKTVOLPre_File -12.1820  10.9456*  11.6524  15.8750** 
 (0.4698)  (0.0850)  (0.2842)  (0.0121) 
SIZE 0.0294***  -0.0009  0.0149***  -0.0059 
 (0.0002)  (0.7618)  (0.0051)  (0.0372) 
BM 0.0475  0.0022  0.0397  0.0045 
 (0.2816)  (0.8823)  (0.1994)  (0.7600) 
PRET 0.0017  -0.0022  -0.0171  -0.0032 
 (0.9288)  (0.7576)  (0.1597)  (0.6561) 
EARNSURPPre_File 0.8570  0.1208  0.5226  0.1705 
 (0.2268)  (0.5586)  (0.2893)  (0.4346) 
TRADESIZE 7.5175  3.3118**  3.5980  3.5527** 
 (0.1166)  (0.0291)  (0.2223)  (0.0189) 
REPORTLAG -0.0330  0.0054  -0.0070  0.0052 
 (0.1047)  (0.4988)  (0.6063)  (0.5153) 
        
R
2 
0.552%  0.348%  0.536%  0.627% 
        
        
F-test
a γ2 + γ3  θ2 + θ3  γ2 + γ3  θ2 + θ3 
P-value 0.5323   0.9232   0.5539   0.8979 
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   P-value    P-value 
Pre-Reg FD
b: test if γ2 = θ2 0.0320    0.0239 
        
Post-Reg FD
c: test if γ2 + γ3 = θ2 + θ3 0.5927    0.6053 
        
 
This table reports results of regression (3) and (4) in columns (1) and (3), and columns (2) and (4), 
respectively, for the sample of 7,131 insider purchases (in Panel A) and 7,191 insider sales (in Panel B). 
The regressions are estimated with year fixed effects. The dependent variable, ANB_LRGPre_File, equals 
ANETVOL_LRGPre_File in column (1) and ANETTRADE_LRGPre_File in column (3). The dependent 
variable, ANB_SMLPre_File, equals ANETVOL_SMLPre_File in column (2) and ANETTRADE_SMLPre_File in 
column (4). Variables are defined in the Appendix. P-values relate to t-statistics corrected for clustering of 
standard errors by firm and are reported in parentheses below the related coefficient estimates.  
 
a
 F-test of the investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable insider trades in the post-Reg FD 
period.  
b
 F-test of the difference between large versus small investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable 
insider trades in the Pre-Reg FD period, using seemingly unrelated regression estimation.   
c
 F-test of the difference between large versus small investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable 
insider trades in the Post-Reg FD period, using seemingly unrelated regression estimation.   
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Table 5 
Effect of Reg FD on the Trading Response to Insider Trades  
in the Post-filing Window 
 
ATR_LRGPost_File = α0+ α1POSTFD + α2PROFIT + α3POSTFD*PROFIT + α4MKTVOLPost_File 
+ α5SIZE + α6BM + α7PRET + α8AEARNSURPPost_File + α9TRADESIZE + 
α10REPORTLAG + ξL                                                                                (1)                                                                                                                               
ATR_SMLPost_File = β0+ β1POSTFD + β2PROFIT + β3POSTFD*PROFIT + β4MKTVOLPost_File 
+ β5SIZE + β6BM + β7PRET + β8AEARNSURPPost_File + β9TRADESIZE + 
β10REPORTLAG + ξS                                                                                (2)                                                                                                                               
  
 AVOLPost_File  ATRADEPost_File 
 Large  Small  Large  Small 
 Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate 
 (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value) 
Intercept -0.3231  -0.5034***  -0.8802***  -0.6329*** 
 (0.3404)  (0.0015)  (0.0001)  (<.0001) 
POSTFD 0.2707*  0.2334***  0.0522  0.1962*** 
 (0.0867)  (0.0007)  (0.6438)  (0.0007) 
PROFIT 0.2151***  -0.0354  0.2000***  0.0251 
 (0.0004)  (0.2426)  (<.0001)  (0.3321) 
POSTFD *PROFIT -0.2077*  0.0170  -0.1904**  -0.0444 
 (0.0852)  (0.7374)  (0.0243)  (0.3219) 
MKTVOLPost_File 150.4536***  144.6641***  175.7782***  129.4511*** 
 (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
SIZE -0.1031***  -0.0353***  -0.0662***  -0.0359*** 
 (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
BM 0.1017  -0.2009***  0.0543  -0.1064*** 
 (0.2633)  (<.0001)  (0.4056)  (0.0002) 
PRET 0.0496  -0.1276***  0.2119***  0.0001 
 (0.3850)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.9973) 
AEARNSURPPost_File 22.5462  53.2008***  21.1818  46.8349*** 
 (0.3145)  (<.0001)  (0.2324)  (<.0001) 
TRADESIZE 21.5335*  11.8300**  33.9767***  14.2456*** 
 (0.0868)  (0.0465)  (0.0012)  (0.0069) 
REPORTLAG -0.0522  -0.0505**  -0.0006  -0.0138 
 (0.2939)  (0.0377)  (0.9845)  (0.4853) 
        
R
2 
0.836%  1.85%  1.62%  1.63% 
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F-test
a α2 + α3  β2 + β3  α2 + α3  β2 + β3 
P-value 0.9434   0.6555   0.894   0.6022 
        
        
   P-value    P-value 
Pre-Reg FD
b: test if α2 = β2  0.0001    0.0001 
        
Post-Reg FD
c: test if α2 + α3 = β2 + β3                                     0.7864    0.6762 
        
 
This table reports results of regressions (1) and (2) in columns (1) and (3), and columns (2) and (4), 
respectively, for the sample of 14,313 insider trade observations. The regressions are estimated with year 
fixed effects. The dependent variable, ATR_LRGPost_File, equals AVOL_LRGPost_File in column (1) and 
ATRADE_LRGPost_File in column (3). The dependent variable, ATR_SMLPost_File, equals AVOL_SMLPost_File 
in column (2) and ATRADE_SMLPost_File in column (4). Variables are defined in the Appendix. P-values 
relate to t-statistics corrected for clustering of standard errors by firm and are reported in parentheses below 
the related coefficient estimates.  
 
a
 F-test of the investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable insider trades in the post-Reg FD 
period.  
b
 F-test of the difference between large versus small investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable 
insider trades in the Pre-Reg FD period, using seemingly unrelated regression estimation.   
c
 F-test of the difference between large versus small investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable 
insider trades in the Post-Reg FD period, using seemingly unrelated regression estimation.   
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Table 6 
Effect of Reg FD on the Trading Response to Insider Trades in the Post-filing 
Window Estimated Separately for Insider Purchases and Insider Sales 
 
ATR_LRGPost_File = α0 + α1POSTFD + α2PROFIT + α3POSTFD*PROFIT + α4MKTVOLPost_File 
+ α5SIZE + α6BM + α7PRET + α8AEARNSURPPost_File + α9TRADESIZE + 
α10REPORTLAG + ξL                                                                                                                             (1)                                                                                                                           
ATR_SMLPost_File = β0 + β1POSTFD + β2PROFIT + β3POSTFD*PROFIT + β4MKTVOLPost_File 
+ β5SIZE + β6BM + β7PRET + β8AEARNSURPPost_File + β9TRADESIZE + 
β10REPORTLAG + ξS                                                                                  (2)                                                                                                                               
       
Panel A: Insider Purchases 
  
 AVOLPost_File  ATRADEPost_File 
 Large  Small  Large  Small 
 Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate 
 (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value) 
Intercept -0.3021  -0.6462**  -0.8115**  -0.7092*** 
 (0.5548)  (0.0015)  (0.0132)  (<.0001) 
POSTFD 0.1050  0.1483  -0.1127  0.0345 
 (0.6438)  (0.1123)  (0.4679)  (0.6092) 
PROFIT 0.3555***  0.0379  0.2648***  0.0783** 
 (0.0004)  (0.3741)  (0.0005)  (0.0258) 
POSTFD *PROFIT -0.1013  -0.0213  -0.0352  0.0103 
 (0.5581)  (0.7906)  (0.7739)  (0.8660) 
MKTVOLPost_File 109.2756  157.1694***  135.6751***  136.5978*** 
 (0.0610)  (<.0001)  (0.0007)  (<.0001) 
SIZE -0.0837***  0.0090  -0.0547***  0.0014 
 (0.0006)  (0.4726)  (0.0028)  (0.8908) 
BM 0.1663  -0.2735***  0.1515*  -0.1280*** 
 (0.1449)  (<.0001)  (0.0618)  (<.0001) 
PRET 0.0854  -0.1183***  0.2279***  0.0264 
 (0.3315)  (0.0085)  (0.0023)  (0.4758) 
AEARNSURPPost_File 17.2895  45.8470***  3.1242  45.5083*** 
 (0.5686)  (0.0042)  (0.8820)  (0.0013) 
TRADESIZE -39.1387**  38.1544***  -20.9795  18.5021** 
 (0.0265)  (0.0059)  (0.1377)  (0.0404) 
REPORTLAG -0.0537  -0.0939***  -0.0100  -0.0644*** 
 (0.4244)  (0.0029)  (0.8166)  (0.0091) 
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R
2 
0.688%  2.82%  1.50%  2.31% 
        
F-test
a α2 + α3  β2 + β3  α2 + α3  β2 + β3 
P-value 0.0688  0.8091  0.0181  0.0770 
        
        
   P-value    P-value 
Pre-Reg FD
b: test if α2 = β2 0.0004    0.0024 
        
Post-Reg FD
c: test if α2 + α3 = β2 + β3 0.1534    0.2201 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Insider Sales 
  
 AVOLPost_File  ATRADEPost_File 
 Large  Small  Large  Small 
 Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate 
 (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value) 
Intercept -0.7612*  -1.0703***  -0.7964**  -0.8914*** 
 (0.0739)  (<.0001)  (0.0150)  (<.0001) 
POSTFD 0.3972**  0.4686***  0.0792  0.3658*** 
 (0.0475)  (<.0001)  (0.6135)  (<.0001) 
PROFIT 0.1786***  0.0461  0.1322**  0.0320 
 (0.0038)  (0.2345)  (0.0160)  (0.3979) 
POSTFD *PROFIT -0.2897**  -0.0650  -0.2129*  -0.0711 
 (0.0433)  (0.3235)  (0.0523)  (0.2620) 
MKTVOLPost_File 196.6403***  123.2254***  226.3010***  121.7192*** 
 (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
SIZE -0.1075***  -0.0432***  -0.0871***  -0.0607*** 
 (<.0001)  (0.0005)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
BM -0.0095  -0.1386**  -0.0637  -0.0761 
 (0.9490)  (0.0244)  (0.5889)  (0.2113) 
PRET 0.0168  -0.0473  0.1305**  0.0021 
 (0.8224)  (0.2283)  (0.0324)  (0.9555) 
AEARNSURPPost_File 33.3974  54.6276***  49.7011*  46.7594** 
 (0.3019)  (0.0061)  (0.0979)  (0.0125) 
TRADESIZE 48.1807***  15.5447**  47.0033***  15.8107** 
 (0.0019)  (0.0220)  (0.0004)  (0.0158) 
REPORTLAG 0.0155  0.1107***  -0.0291  0.1017*** 
 (0.8106)  (0.0006)  (0.5680)  (0.0009) 
        
R
2 
1.73%  2.16%  2.48%  2.31% 
        
F-test
a α2 + α3  β2 + β3  α2 + α3  β2 + β3 
P-value 0.3904   0.7347   0.4012   0.4590 
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   P-value    P-value 
Pre-Reg FD
b: test if α2 = β2 0.0738    0.0868 
        
Post-Reg FD
c: test if α2 + α3 = β2 + β3 0.4077    0.6359 
        
 
This table reports results of regression (1) and (2) in columns (1) and (3), and columns (2) and (4), 
respectively, for the sample of 7,126 insider purchases (in Panel A) and 7,187 insider sales (in Panel B). 
The regressions are estimated with year fixed effects. The dependent variable, ATR_LRGPost_File, equals 
AVOL_LRGPost_File in column (1) and ATRADE_LRGPost_File in column (3). The dependent variable, 
ATR_SMLPost_File, equals AVOL_SMLPost_File in column (2) and ATRADE_SMLPost_File in column (4). 
Variables are defined in the Appendix. P-values relate to t-statistics corrected for clustering of standard 
errors by firm and are reported in parentheses below the related coefficient estimates.  
 
a
 F-test of the investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable insider trades in the post-Reg FD 
period.  
b
 F-test of the difference between large versus small investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable 
insider trades in the Pre-Reg FD period, using seemingly unrelated regression estimation.   
c
 F-test of the difference between large versus small investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable 
insider trades in the Post-Reg FD period, using seemingly unrelated regression estimation.   
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Table 7 
Effect of Reg FD on the Net-buying Response to Insider Trades in the Post-filing 
Window Estimated Separately for Insider Purchases and Insider Sales 
 
ANB_LRG Post_File = γ0+ γ1POSTFD + γ2PROFIT + γ3POSTFD*PROFIT + γ4MKTVOLPost_File 
+ γ5SIZE + γ6BM + γ7PRET + γ8EARNSURPPost_File + γ9TRADESIZE + 
γ10REPORTLAG + εL                                                                                 (3)                                                                                                                                 
ANB_SMLPost_File = θ0+ θ1POSTFD + θ2PROFIT + θ3POSTFD*PROFIT + θ4MKTVOLPost_File 
+ θ5SIZE + θ6BM + θ7PRET + θ8EARNSURPPost_File + θ9TRADESIZE + 
θ10REPORTLAG + εS                                                                              (4)                                                                                                                               
 
Panel A: Insider Purchases 
  
 ANETVOLPost_File  ANETTRADEPost_File 
 Large  Small  Large  Small 
 Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate 
 (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value) 
Intercept -0.0464  0.2751***  0.2606  0.2765*** 
 (0.8218)  (0.0003)  (0.0738)  (<.0001) 
POSTFD -0.1843  -0.0364  -0.1597  -0.0214 
 (0.1025)  (0.2609)  (0.0348)  (0.4632) 
PROFIT 0.1181***  0.0310*  0.0757***  0.0247* 
 (0.0010)  (0.0542)  (0.0039)  (0.0827) 
POSTFD *PROFIT 0.0558  0.0190  0.0287  0.0069 
 (0.5155)  (0.4897)  (0.6091)  (0.7707) 
MKTVOLPost_File 5.9062  -22.7217***  -11.9337  -22.0188*** 
 (0.7945)  (0.0058)  (0.4747)  (0.0035) 
SIZE -0.0025  0.0048  -0.0153*  -0.0034 
 (0.8173)  (0.2874)  (0.0537)  (0.4094) 
BM 0.0817*  -0.0323**  0.0297  -0.0354*** 
 (0.0802)  (0.0346)  (0.3783)  (0.0082) 
PRET 0.0177  -0.0483***  -0.0154  -0.0426*** 
 (0.5958)  (0.0006)  (0.5618)  (0.0008) 
EARNSURPPost_File -16.5442  1.9351  -13.5766  1.5902 
 (0.1411)  (0.7128)  (0.1300)  (0.7611) 
TRADESIZE 17.4106**  1.9491  3.4547  1.6179 
 (0.0417)  (0.6657)  (0.6367)  (0.6458) 
REPORTLAG -0.0123  -0.0229**  -0.0106  -0.0189** 
 (0.6741)  (0.0337)  (0.5739)  (0.0396) 
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R
2 
0.574%  0.599%  0.358%  0.562% 
        
F-test
a γ2 + γ3  θ2 + θ3  γ2 + γ3  θ2 + θ3 
P-value 0.0270   0.0259   0.0358   0.0936 
        
        
   P-value    P-value 
Pre-Reg FD
b: test if γ2 = θ2 0.0276    0.0770 
        
Post-Reg FD
c: test if γ2 + γ3 = θ2 + θ3 0.0906    0.1758 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Insider Sales 
  
 ANETVOLPost_File  ANETTRADEPost_File 
 Large  Small  Large  Small 
 Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate 
 (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value) 
Intercept -0.0338  -0.0361  -0.0195  -0.0328 
 (0.8429)  (0.5849)  (0.8775)  (0.6126) 
POSTFD -0.0473  0.0243  0.0132  0.0249 
 (0.5322)  (0.3627)  (0.8120)  (0.3326) 
PROFIT -0.0778***  -0.0148  -0.0637***  -0.0166 
 (0.0098)  (0.2584)  (0.0042)  (0.1998) 
POSTFD *PROFIT 0.1099**  -0.0069  0.0774**  -0.0026 
 (0.0296)  (0.7380)  (0.0375)  (0.8986) 
MKTVOLPost_File -17.6989  -14.6582**  -13.7586  -14.0315** 
 (0.2971)  (0.0253)  (0.2876)  (0.0292) 
SIZE 0.0243**  0.0140***  0.0161**  0.0132*** 
 (0.0102)  (0.0004)  (0.0317)  (0.0006) 
BM 0.0419  -0.0124  0.0309  -0.0106 
 (0.4436)  (0.5269)  (0.4773)  (0.5880) 
PRET -0.0245  -0.0150  -0.0219  -0.0087 
 (0.3229)  (0.1176)  (0.2276)  (0.3491) 
EARNSURPPost_File -11.3412  2.4968  -3.4264  3.5154 
 (0.3613)  (0.6243)  (0.7385)  (0.4765) 
TRADESIZE 11.4552**  -1.3342  3.8467  -1.2583 
 (0.0346)  (0.4932)  (0.3591)  (0.5200) 
REPORTLAG -0.0319  0.0092  -0.0145  0.0057 
 (0.2015)  (0.4122)  (0.4364)  (0.5951) 
        
R
2 
0.425%  0.809%  0.475%  0.784% 
        
F-test
a γ2 + γ3  θ2 + θ3  γ2 + γ3  θ2 + θ3 
P-value 0.4750  0.2560  0.6767  0.3012 
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   P-value    P-value 
Pre-Reg FD
b: test if γ2 = θ2 0.0536    0.0601 
        
Post-Reg FD
c: test if γ2 + γ3 = θ2 + θ3 0.3145    0.3887 
        
 
This table reports results of regression (3) and (4) in columns (1) and (3), and columns (2) and (4), 
respectively, for the sample of insider purchases (in Panel A) and insider sales (in Panel B). The regressions 
are estimated with year fixed effects. The dependent variable, ANB_LRGPost_File, equals 
ANETVOL_LRGPost_File in column (1) and ANETTRADE_LRGPost_File in column (3). The dependent 
variable, ANB_SMLPost_File, equals ANETVOL_SMLPost_File in column (2) and ANETTRADE_SMLPost_File 
in column (4). Variables are defined in the Appendix. P-values relate to t-statistics corrected for clustering 
of standard errors by firm and are reported in parentheses below the related coefficient estimates. 
 
a
 F-test of the investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable insider trades in the post-Reg FD 
period.  
b
 F-test of the difference between large versus small investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable 
insider trades in the Pre-Reg FD period, using seemingly unrelated regression estimation.   
c
 F-test of the difference between large versus small investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable 
insider trades in the Post-Reg FD period, using seemingly unrelated regression estimation.   
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Table 8 
Effect of Reg FD on the Trading Response to Insider Trades  
in the Post-trading-Pre-filing Window 
 
ATR_LRGTrade_File = α0+ α1POSTFD + α2PROFIT + α3POSTFD*PROFIT + 
α4MKTVOLTrade_File + α5SIZE + α6BM + α7PRET + 
α8AEARNSURPTrade_File + α9TRADESIZE + α10REPORTLAG + ξL       (1)                                                                                                                                
ATR_SMLTrade_File = β0+ β1POSTFD + β2PROFIT + β3POSTFD*PROFIT + β4MKTVOLPre_File 
+ β5SIZE + β6BM + β7PRET + β8AEARNSURPTrade_File + β9TRADESIZE 
+ β10REPORTLAG + ξS                                                                           (2)                                                                                                                                  
  
 AVOLTrade_File  ATRADETrade_File 
 Large  Small  Large  Small 
 Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate 
 (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value) 
Intercept -0.7581**  -0.5771***  -1.1539***  -0.6179*** 
 (0.0262)  (0.0003)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
POSTFD 0.3173**  0.2243***  0.0319  0.1861*** 
 (0.0243)  (0.0001)  (0.7287)  (0.0001) 
PROFIT 0.1831***  -0.0346  0.1607***  0.0089 
 (0.0001)  (0.2071)  (<.0001)  (0.6868) 
POSTFD*PROFIT -0.2819***  -0.0176  -0.2580***  -0.0534 
 (0.0042)  (0.6957)  (0.0002)  (0.1665) 
MKTVOLTrade_File 228.4334***  167.6466***  238.4169***  150.6572*** 
 (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
SIZE -0.1352***  -0.0464***  -0.0802***  -0.0500*** 
 (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
BM 0.0442  -0.1602***  -0.0233  -0.0960*** 
 (0.5539)  (<.0001)  (0.6794)  (0.0002) 
PRET -0.0532  -0.1740***  0.1179***  -0.0535** 
 (0.2463)  (<.0001)  (0.0033)  (0.0166) 
AEARNSURPTrade_File -4.7892  6.9246**  -1.9777  4.9188* 
 (0.4686)  (0.0462)  (0.6925)  (0.0841) 
TRADESIZE 44.5761***  11.4345**  59.9796***  17.5959*** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0459)  (<.0001)  (0.0003) 
REPORTLAG 0.0152  -0.0594**  0.0307  -0.0265 
 (0.7564)  (<.0202)  (0.3859)  (0.1927) 
        
R
2 
2.12%  2.89%  2.76%  2.02% 
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F-test
a
 α2 + α3  β2 + β3  α2 + α3  β2 + β3 
P-value 0.2523   0.1816   0.1824   0.1581 
        
        
   P-value    P-value 
Pre-Reg FD
b: test if α2 = β2  0.0001    0.0001 
       
Post-Reg FD
c: test if α2 + α3 = β2 + β3                                    0.5558    0.3659 
      
 
This table reports results of regressions (1) and (2) in columns (1) and (3), and columns (2) and (4), 
respectively, for the sample of 14,192 insider trade observations. The regressions are estimated with year 
fixed effects. The dependent variable, ATR_LRGTrade_File, equals AVOL_LRGTrade_File in column (1) and 
ATRADE_LRGTrade_File in column (3). The dependent variable, ATR_SMLTrade_File, equals 
AVOL_SMLTrade_File in column (2) and ATRADE_SMLTrade_File in column (4). Variables are defined in the 
Appendix. P-values relate to t-statistics corrected for clustering of standard errors by firm and are reported 
in parentheses below the related coefficient estimates.  
 
a
 F-test of the investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable insider trades in the post-Reg FD 
period.  
b
 F-test of the difference between large versus small investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable 
insider trades in the Pre-Reg FD period, using seemingly unrelated regression estimation.   
c
 F-test of the difference between large versus small investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable 
insider trades in the Post-Reg FD period, using seemingly unrelated regression estimation.   
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Table 9 
Effect of Reg FD on the Trading Response to Insider Trades in the Post-trading-
Pre-filing Window Estimated Separately for Insider Purchases and Insider Sales 
 
ATR_LRGTrade_File = α0+ α1POSTFD + α2PROFIT + α3POSTFD*PROFIT + 
α4MKTVOLTrade_File + α5SIZE + α6BM + α7PRET + 
α8AEARNSURPTrade_File + α9TRADESIZE + α10REPORTLAG + ξL      (1)                                            
ATR_SMLTrade_File = β0+ β1POSTFD + β2PROFIT + β3POSTFD*PROFIT + 
β4MKTVOLTrade_File + β5SIZE + β6BM + β7PRET + 
β8AEARNSURPTrade_File + β9TRADESIZE + β10REPORTLAG + ξS       (2)                                              
 
Panel A: Insider Purchases 
  
 AVOLTrade_File  ATRADETrade_File 
 Large  Small  Large  Small 
 Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate 
 (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value) 
Intercept -1.0939**  -0.7354***  -1.2950***  -0.7401*** 
 (0.0374)  (0.0008)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
POSTFD 0.4160  0.1810**  0.0723  0.1246* 
 (0.1010)  (0.0366)  (0.6136)  (0.0583) 
PROFIT 0.2135***  0.0067  0.1310**  0.0330 
 (0.0066)  (0.8768)  (0.0243)  (0.3153) 
POSTFD*PROFIT -0.3403**  -0.0932  -0.2185**  -0.0689 
 (0.0470)  (0.2207)  (0.0429)  (0.2402) 
MKTVOLTrade_File 200.9047***  170.4050***  187.8775***  140.7394*** 
 (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
SIZE -0.0676***  0.0145  -0.0262*  0.0069 
 (0.0024)  (0.3126)  (0.0863)  (0.5402) 
BM 0.0662  -0.2572***  0.1498**  -0.1511*** 
 (0.4700)  (<.0001)  (0.0196)  (0.0001) 
PRET -0.0252  -0.1589***  0.1104*  -0.0231 
 (0.7641)  (0.0005)  (0.0759)  (0.5248) 
AEARNSURPTrade_File -4.4563  5.0616  -1.6244  3.7105 
 (0.6416)  (0.2825)  (0.8019)  (0.3264) 
TRADESIZE 10.3481  13.0581  8.8148  5.1401 
 (0.6734)  (0.2911)  (0.5934)  (0.5767) 
REPORTLAG -0.0011  -0.0901**  -0.0136  -0.0690** 
 (0.9875)  (0.0145)  (0.7731)  (0.0124) 
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R
2 
1.79%  2.21%  1.13%  2.03% 
        
F-test
a
 α2 + α3  β2 + β3  α2 + α3  β2 + β3 
P-value 0.4093  0.1616  0.3484  0.4560 
        
        
   P-value    P-value 
Pre-Reg FD
b
: test if α2 = β2                                    0.0058    0.0555 
        
Post-Reg FD
c: test if α2 + α3 = β2 + β3                                    0.7748    0.5935 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Insider Sales 
  
 AVOLTrade_File  ATRADETrade_File 
 Large  Small  Large  Small 
 Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate 
 (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value) 
Intercept -0.4906  -0.9871***  -0.7485**  -0.7868*** 
 (0.2439)  (<.0001)  (0.0350)  (0.0002) 
POSTFD 0.2579  0.4006***  -0.0797  0.2921*** 
 (0.1057)  (<.0001)  (0.5343)  (<.0001) 
PROFIT 0.1412**  0.0355  0.1152**  0.0307 
 (0.0149)  (0.2622)  (0.0289)  (0.2933) 
POSTFD*PROFIT -0.2552**  -0.0572  -0.1828*  -0.0534 
 (0.0299)  (0.3072)  (0.0587)  (0.3134) 
MKTVOLTrade_File 247.4692***  150.4188***  304.8808***  157.0576*** 
 (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
SIZE -0.1943***  -0.0704***  -0.1580***  -0.0911*** 
 (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
BM 0.0241  -0.0855  -0.1948*  -0.0767 
 (0.8560)  (0.1281)  (0.0694)  (0.1526) 
PRET -0.0871  -0.1022***  0.0304  -0.0465 
 (0.1168)  (0.0012)  (0.5751)  (0.1155) 
AEARNSURPTrade_File -5.1676  6.2403  1.5190  5.8749 
 (0.4815)  (0.1832)  (0.8457)  (0.1575) 
TRADESIZE 54.9837***  24.2385***  60.2258***  25.1935*** 
 (<.0001)  (0.0003)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
REPORTLAG 0.0586  0.0769**  0.0232  0.0702** 
 (0.3887)  (0.0106)  (0.6684)  (0.0122) 
        
R
2 
3.96%  3.59%  5.77%  4.26% 
        
F-test
a
 α2 + α3  β2 + β3  α2 + α3  β2 + β3 
P-value 0.2666   0.6445   0.4034   0.6119 
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   P-value    P-value 
Pre-Reg FD
b: test if α2 = β2 0.0877    0.0910 
        
Post-Reg FD
c: test if α2 + α3 = β2 + β3 0.3226    0.5507 
        
 
This table reports results of regression (1) and (2) in columns (1) and (3), and columns (2) and (4), 
respectively, for the sample of 7,019 insider purchases (in Panel A) and 7,173 insider sales (in Panel B). 
The regressions are estimated with year fixed effects. The dependent variable, ATR_LRGTrade_File, equals 
AVOL_LRGTrade_File in column (1) and ATRADE_LRGTrade_File in column (3). The dependent variable, 
ATR_SMLTrade_File, equals AVOL_SMLTrade_File in column (2) and ATRADE_SMLTrade_File in column (4). 
Variables are defined in the Appendix. P-values relate to t-statistics corrected for clustering of standard 
errors by firm and are reported in parentheses below the related coefficient estimates.  
 
a
 F-test of the investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable insider trades in the post-Reg FD 
period.  
b
 F-test of the difference between large versus small investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable 
insider trades in the Pre-Reg FD period, using seemingly unrelated regression estimation.   
c
 F-test of the difference between large versus small investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable 
insider trades in the Post-Reg FD period, using seemingly unrelated regression estimation.   
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Table 10 
Effect of Reg FD on the Net-buying Response to Insider Trades  
in the Post-trading-Pre-filing Window 
Estimated Separately for Insider Purchases and Insider Sales 
 
ANB_LRGTrade_File = γ0 + γ1POSTFD + γ2PROFIT + γ3POSTFD*PROFIT + 
γ4MKTVOLTrade_File + γ5SIZE + γ6BM + γ7PRET + γ8EARNSURPTrade_File 
+ γ9TRADESIZE + γ10REPORTLAG + εL                                              (3) 
ANB_SMLTrade_File = θ0 + θ1POSTFD + θ2PROFIT + θ3POSTFD*PROFIT + 
θ4MKTVOLTrade_File + θ5SIZE + θ6BM + θ7PRET + θ8EARNSURPTrade_File 
+ θ9TRADESIZE + θ10REPORTLAG + εS                                              (4)  
 
Panel A: Insider Purchases 
  
 ANETVOLTrade_File  ANETTRADETrade_File 
 Large  Small  Large  Small 
 Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate 
 (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value) 
Intercept -0.0145  0.2066***  -0.0937  0.2247*** 
 (0.9465)  (0.0086)  (0.5301)  (0.0011) 
POSTFD 0.0096  -0.0631**  0.0205  -0.0717*** 
 (0.9189)  (0.0266)  (0.7454)  (0.0058) 
PROFIT 0.0761**  0.0074  0.0664**  0.0054 
 (0.0206)  (0.5712)  (0.0266)  (0.7287) 
POSTFD*PROFIT -0.1290*  0.0220  -0.0721*  0.0136 
 (0.0573)  (0.3503)  (0.0753)  (0.4173) 
MKTVOLTrade_File -9.0768  -3.7750  4.7759  -2.7390 
 (0.6917)  (0.6421)  (0.7595)  (0.7056) 
SIZE 0.0090  0.0020  0.0018  -0.0040 
 (0.3718)  (0.6199)  (0.8061)  (0.2763) 
BM -0.0282  -0.0216*  0.0202  -0.0240** 
 (0.5029)  (0.0797)  (0.4993)  (0.0385) 
PRET -0.0151  -0.0415***  -0.0230  -0.0319*** 
 (0.6334)  (0.0007)  (0.3318)  (0.0043) 
EARNSURPTrade_File 3.4900  -0.8398  0.5931  -0.5567 
 (0.3292)  (0.4648)  (0.8173)  (0.5825) 
TRADESIZE 10.9814  -4.4466  7.0789  -3.8638 
 (0.2297)  (0.2388)  (0.3414)  (0.2579) 
REPORTLAG 0.0028  -0.0301**  0.0159  -0.0246** 
 (0.9174)  (0.0107)  (0.4019)  (0.0140) 
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R
2 
0.518%  1.23%  0.189%  1.36% 
        
F-test
a γ2 + γ3  θ2 + θ3  γ2 + γ3  θ2 + θ3 
P-value 0.3754   0.1871   0.7819   0.3685 
        
        
   P-value    P-value 
Pre-Reg FD
b: test if γ2 = θ2 0.0507    0.0677 
        
Post-Reg FD
c: test if γ2 + γ3 = θ2 + θ3 0.2156    0.3656 
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Table 10 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Insider Sales 
  
 ANETVOLTrade_File  ANETTRADETrade_File 
 Large  Small  Large  Small 
 Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate 
 (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value)  (P-value) 
Intercept -0.3768**  -0.1852***  -0.2768**  -0.2372*** 
 (0.0204)  (0.0080)  (0.0144)  (0.0003) 
POSTFD -0.0531  -0.0170  -0.0521  -0.0106 
 (0.3063)  (0.4657)  (0.1676)  (0.6197) 
PROFIT -0.0669***  -0.0149  -0.0390**  -0.0063 
 (0.0043)  (0.1725)  (0.0210)  (0.5420) 
POSTFD*PROFIT 0.0834**  0.0000  0.0557*  -0.0093 
 (0.0474)  (0.9979)  (0.0628)  (0.5468) 
MKTVOLTrade_File 8.9602  13.2385*  30.7565***  20.1504*** 
 (0.5867)  (0.0518)  (0.0080)  (0.0022) 
SIZE 0.0369***  0.0079**  0.0177***  0.0053* 
 (<.0001)  (0.0160)  (0.0040)  (0.0919) 
BM 0.0861*  0.0171  0.0612*  0.0168 
 (0.0601)  (0.3076)  (0.0728)  (0.3128) 
PRET -0.0172  0.0059  -0.0308**  -0.0005 
 (0.3760)  (0.4564)  (0.0304)  (0.9522) 
EARNSURPTrade_File 0.2810  -0.7315  1.8348  -0.3410 
 (0.9136)  (0.6098)  (0.4151)  (0.7989) 
TRADESIZE 6.1824  2.1244  0.5710  1.7722 
 (0.1715)  (0.2380)  (0.8604)  (0.3015) 
REPORTLAG 0.0039  0.0134  -0.0194  0.0168* 
 (0.8783)  (0.2123)  (0.2586)  (0.0970) 
        
R
2 
0.963%  0.228%  1.024%  0.774% 
        
F-test
a γ2 + γ3  θ2 + θ3  γ2 + γ3  θ2 + θ3 
P-value 0.6381   0.2305   0.5025   0.1916 
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   P-value    P-value 
Pre-Reg FD
b: test if γ2 = θ2 0.0446    0.0890 
        
Post-Reg FD
c: test if γ2 + γ3 = θ2 + θ3 0.4250    0.2661 
        
 
This table reports results of regression (3) and (4) in columns (1) and (3), and columns (2) and (4), 
respectively, for the sample of 7,019 insider purchases (in Panel A) and 7,173 insider sales (in Panel B). 
The regressions are estimated with year fixed effects. The dependent variable, ANB_LRGTrade_File, equals 
ANETVOL_LRGTrade_File in column (1) and ANETTRADE_LRGTrade_File in column (3). The dependent 
variable, ANB_SMLTrade_File, equals ANETVOL_SMLTrade_File in column (2) and 
ANETTRADE_SMLTrade_File in column (4). Variables are defined in the Appendix. P-values relate to t-
statistics corrected for clustering of standard errors by firm and are reported in parentheses below the 
related coefficient estimates.  
 
a
 F-test of the investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable insider trades in the post-Reg FD 
period.  
b
 F-test of the difference between large versus small investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable 
insider trades in the Pre-Reg FD period, using seemingly unrelated regression estimation.   
c
 F-test of the difference between large versus small investors' response to profitable relative to unprofitable 
insider trades in the Post-Reg FD period, using seemingly unrelated regression estimation.   
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
AVOL_SMLWindow (AVOL_LRGWindow) = Small (Large) investors’ average daily 
abnormal trading volume (i.e., number of shares traded) over the window of interest (i.e., 
Pre_File or Post_File), calculated by subtracting the average daily trading volume of 
small (large) investors of a firm during the benchmark window from the average daily 
trading volume of small (large) investors during the window of interest, scaled by the 
average daily trading volume of small (large) investors during the benchmark window. 
 
ATRADE_SMLWindow (ATRADE_LRGWindow) = Small (Large) investors’ average daily 
abnormal number of trades over the window of interest (i.e., Pre_File or Post_File), 
calculated by subtracting the average daily number of trades made by small (large) 
investors of a firm during the benchmark window from the average daily number trades 
made by small (large) investors during the window of interest, scaled by the average 
daily number of trades made by small (large) investors during the benchmark window. 
 
ANETVOL_SMLWindow (ANETVOL_LRGWindow) = Small (Large) investors’ average 
daily abnormal net-buy (i.e., buy less sell) in terms of number of  shares (i.e., volume) 
over the window of interest (i.e., Pre_File or Post_File), calculated by subtracting small 
(large) investors’ average daily net-buy volume during the benchmark window from 
small (large) investors’ average daily net-buy volume during the window of interest, 
scaled by the average daily trading volume of small (large) investors during the 
benchmark window. 
 
ANETTRADE_SMLWindow (ANETTRADE_LRGWindow) = Small (Large) investors’ 
average daily abnormal net-buy in terms of number of trades (i.e., buy less sell) over the 
window of interest (i.e., Pre_File or Post_File), calculated by subtracting small (large) 
investors’ average daily number of net-buy trades during the benchmark window from 
small (large) investors’ average daily number of net-buy trades during the window of 
interest, scaled by the average daily number of trades made by small (large) investors 
during the benchmark window. 
 
Pre_File =  Pre-filing window, which begins 10 trading days prior to the insider trade 
date and ends one day prior to the SEC filing date. 
 
Post_File = Post filing window from day +1 to day +4, where day 0 is the insider-trade 
filing date.  
 
Benchmark: Benchmark window, including 20 trading days, ending 10 trading days 
prior to the insider trade date. Days that fall in a [-3, +3] window around an earnings 
announcement are excluded.  
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PROFIT = An indicator variable that equals one if the 6-month buy-and-hold market-
adjusted stock return after the insider transaction date is positive for insider purchases 
and negative for insider sales, zero otherwise. 
 
POSTFD = An indicator variable that equals one if an insider transaction date is after 
October 23, 2000, and zero otherwise. 
 
SIZE = Firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of market value of equity (in 
millions), where market value of equity is the product of the stock price and the number 
of common shares outstanding at the end of the prior fiscal quarter.  
 
BM = Book to market ratio, measured as the book value of equity divided by the market 
value of equity at the end of the prior quarter. 
 
PRET = Buy-and-hold 6-month market-adjusted stock return before the insider 
transaction date. 
 
EARNSURP = Earnings surprise, measured as the difference between the quarterly EPS 
and the EPS of the same quarter of the previous year, deflated by the closing share price 
at the end of the prior quarter. 
 
AEARNSURP = Absolute value of EARNSURP. 
 
MKTVOLwindow = The average daily percentage of all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms’ 
outstanding shares traded over respective windows. 
 
TRADESIZE = Number of shares purchased/sold by the top five executives (CEO, 
Chairman, CFO, COO, and Vice President) as reported in Form 4, divided by common 
shares outstanding. 
 
REPORTLAG = The natural logarithm of one plus the number of trading days between 
the insider transaction date and the SEC filing date. 
 
